KEEP YOUR DISTANCE: THE SHIFTING OF AMERICA S STRATEGIC MINDSET IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE SYRIAN WAR. by Jones, Nicholas Charles
1 
 
 
 
KEEP YOUR DISTANCE: THE SHIFTING OF AMERICA’S STRATEGIC 
MINDSET IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
SYRIAN WAR. 
By 
Nicholas Jones 
A Thesis Submitted for the Completion of Degree for Master of Social Science, Peace 
and Conflict Studies. 
University of Oslo May 2014. 
Supervised by Doctor Tore Nyhamar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Acknowledgements 
  I would like to bestow my thanks to the country of Norway and to the University 
of Oslo for providing me with the opportunity and the experience of completing a 
Graduate study program in the field of international relations. I would also like to thank 
my thesis supervisor Dr. Tore Nyhamar for providing me with the insight and guidance 
necessary to conduct such a large research endeavour.  
I would also like to thank my family, friends and especially my parents in their 
support of my efforts in this study. I will also acknowledge my manager and my 
colleagues for their patience in allowing me to continue my study whilst remaining 
employed.  
Without the help of all those mentioned, I would not have been able to carry out 
my study to its true potential. I would like to dedicate this work on behalf of the Syrian 
peoples, and to their continuing struggle for stability and good governance. May their 
strife against the greater self-interested forces of the world not be forgotten, even as the 
international community continues to ignore their suffering and discounts the animosities 
they have faced. May the end of this terrible war result in a more stable and unified Syria, 
which upholds the norms of international law, and has a democratic leadership that 
follows the interests of its people.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Presentation of Research Paper        5 
 
1.1 Introduction         5 
 
1.2 Research Question         6 
 
1.3 Hypothesis          7 
 
1.4 The Case Study Why Syria        7 
       2.    Exploring Theoretical Concepts and Strategies      12 
 2.1 America’s Changing Strategic Mindset      12 
 2.2 Lessons From the Iraq War        14 
 2.3 The Theory of Offshore Balancing       16 
2.4 The Use of Wedge Strategies in Relation to America’s Grand Strategy  20 
2.5 Coercive Diplomacy as a Means of Exercising offshore Balancing   29 
          3. Theoretical Conception and Research Methods      33 
 3.1 Presenting the Theoretical Model       34 
 32. The Process Tracing Method        39 
 3.3 Identifying the Variables of Interest       45 
          4. Investigating Key Actors and Their Interests      47 
 4.1 Identifying the Principal Actors in the Conflict     47 
 4.2 America’s Involvement with Syria       47 
 4.3 America’s Dealings with Iran        51 
 4.4 The Strategic Importance of Syria for Iran      53 
 4.5 Russia’s Role in the Syrian War       55 
 4.6 The Gulf States and Syria        58 
          5. The Causal Pathway in the Syrian War       61 
 5.1 Identifying the Causal Pathway        61 
 5.2 The Assad Regime         61 
 5.3 The Russian Factor in Syria        66 
 5.4 Measuring the Effects of America’s Immediate Response    68 
 5.5 The Scope of Iran’s Response and Greater Involvement     70 
4 
 
 5.6 The Fractured Opposition and Emergence of Foreign Fighters   73 
 5.7 U.S. Response to Iranian Efforts in Syria      76 
 5.8 Chemical Weapons Usage and Assad Crossing the Red Line    80 
 5.9 U.S. Chemical Weapons Response and Subsequent Momentum Shift   83 
          6. Findings and Closing Remarks        86 
 6.1 Findings from the Empirical Analysis       86 
 6.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Relative Evidence     89 
 6.3 Concluding Remarks         92 
          7. Bibliography           94 
          8. Index           99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Chapter 1. Presentation of Research Paper. 
1.1 Introduction. 
Syria has spiraled into an uncontrollable situation, which threatens to engulf the 
entire Arab world into a raging sectarian conflict. This threatens the national interests of 
America and its allies, the stability of the region, and will most certainly undermine any 
progress towards a peaceful transition in the Middle East. Yet America has shown a clear 
reluctance in wanting to pursue any form of intervention in Syria.  
This unwillingness to take action when there is a clear moral and humanitarian 
disaster unfolding could be interpreted as a lack of leadership from the American 
President. However, it is vital to consider the justification for this inaction, in order to 
give perspective on how this play fits the design of a grander U.S. strategy as a whole. 
Nonetheless, many academic scholars, researchers, and policy analysts, have felt the urge 
to stress that the current American Administration is simply not getting the job done. 
When there are so many interests at hand it is nearly vital for the U.S. to become 
involved in the Syrian War in some extent. Why then does it choose to remain on the 
sidelines and pursue a policy of leading from behind, and how can it afford to ignore 
these key regional objectives and interests?  
The answer remains highly complex, and the current American strategy towards 
the conflict in Syria must not only reflect upon their immediate interests, but also take 
into consideration the interests of their allies who inhabit the region, and above all it must 
reflective of America’s own strengths, capabilities, and realities. The decisions that the 
United States takes in Syria today must not be only beneficial in the short term but must 
also prove to be the correct action as time unfolds. 
  It is not only the United States which has the insufficient means to bring this 
conflict to a close. The most detrimental action which impedes the progression of a 
humanitarian intervention in Syria is the obvious and continuing abuse of the United 
Nations Security Council by the vetoing powers of Russia and China. It is clear that there 
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are many other nations which hold a particular interest in this region, and more 
specifically within this sovereign state.        
Any approach the U.S. takes towards Syria must also take into account the 
consequences that will unfold, following an increased American role in the conflict. Thus 
Syria remains a conundrum for America, in which there remain many interests but far too 
few options available.    
1.2 Research Question. 
In order to properly account for how U.S. strategy is being utilized to achieve 
specific goals, a suitable research question must be presented. This question must also be 
capable of relaying how these key strategic interests are pursued in Syria, reflect upon a 
regional and global strategic focus. Therefore the following research question will be 
presented. How does America’s reliance upon diplomatic measures to resolve the 
unsettling conflict in Syria better serve their immediate regional interests, as well as 
solidify their overall security strategy? 
 It is essential that both the American strategy in the Middle East as well as the 
global U.S. security strategy be linked, yet it is just as equally important to be able to 
distinguish between the two. America’s strategic focus in the Middle East region is 
highly centric. It only applies to that arena, and it is highly dependent upon America’s 
foreign policy towards specific regional players. The global security strategy on the other 
hand, is a much more overarching approach to the maintenance of the current strategic 
power balance.  
In the case of the Syrian War, the humanitarian cost coupled with growing 
concerns over Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, and the emergence of a violent 
sectarian war, has transformed the conflict into something much more. This relatively 
small conflict has been given a global agenda, as there are major fears that a post Assad 
Syria could further destabilize the Middle East. The sectarian war can also have regional 
implications as the violence spreads, and these chemical weapons will pose a grave 
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security risk if they fall into the hands of terrorists. These are all fears which some states 
wish to quell and others wish to capitalize on. Therefore, America’s strategic focus in the 
Middle East must be in line with their global security strategy, as this conflict clearly 
holds an international context, and expands far beyond the borders of Syria. 
1.3 Hypothesis.   
The main hypothesis of this study is that by maintaining a relative absence within 
the Syrian War, the U.S. can achieve its strategic interests by making effective use of 
diplomatic strategies. The anti-thesis would present itself in the form of some of the harsh 
criticism, which has emerged in the recent years over Washington’s response to the crisis 
as it unfolded. To state it as such, the null hypothesis would be that America’s current 
policy and strategy in the Syrian War has only served to undermine U.S. regional security 
interests, and has allowed for an escalation in violence which further threatens global 
stability. A third or alternative hypothesis will also be given consideration. This will state 
that the current U.S. strategy runs counterintuitive against what the real U.S. interests in 
Syria are. 
 The hypothesis if proven valid, will indicate that the case of Syria does suggest 
that the U.S. has altered its strategy, in hopes to further its strategic goals through means 
other than exercising its military force. The null hypothesis on the other hand, will rely 
upon evidence indicating that the current measures taken do not help to further America’s 
strategic and security objectives. Furthermore, the null hypothesis will have to explain 
that the reasoning as to why no military action has been taken in this conflict is because 
America does not have vital interests which sanction the use of military force.  
 For the third hypothesis to hold validity there will have to be a substantial amount 
of evidence which indicates that Washington’s motives in Syria are conflicting with the 
essential security interests at stake.  
1.4 The Case Study, Why Syria? 
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 Two immediate questions first come to mind when assessing the value of a case 
study conducted on the Syrian War. The first would be what makes Syria so different, 
and the second, why does Syria matter? It would be prudent to assume that the answers to 
these questions could be provided in a couple short sentences, or with some rudimentary 
research. Nonetheless, with the help of this research thesis, it is my intention to present 
and contribute to the existing knowledge which attempts to unravel the conundrum called 
Syria. The underlying aim of this project is to root out the causes and subsequent chain of 
events, which have hindered the advancement of U.S. actions and interests in this 
conflict. It is also vital for this study to explain how a diplomatic effort remains to be an 
essential process for the U.S., if it is to gain its most desired outcome. This research 
project will also uncover some of the conditions which have been detrimental to the 
international community’s efforts in establishing a humanitarian relief effort, or 
intervention. Yet as I will stress now, the indented purposes of this research and of its 
findings, has been to explain and examine the position and the actions of the United 
States in this conflict.  
 Now then it is time to provide an explanation as to why the Syrian case is unique 
and why it is significant. For the first question, “What makes Syria so different?”, the 
intention of the mind is to compare Syria with other obvious cases such as Libya, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan, and then state, if an intervention was possible in these countries, then 
why is a similar action not feasible in Syria? The short answer is that Syria in itself holds 
a variety of historic and religious affiliations to many different countries, which makes it 
almost impervious to these types of interventions. This is best described when 
highlighting just some of the complexities which prevent a “Libyan-style” type of 
intervention from occurring in Syria. 
 One can observe that prior to the onset of an intervention in Libya, Gadhafi 
remained fairly isolated and was weak militarily. Assad’s Syria on the other hand has 
presented itself as being a stark contrast to this. The Syrian military remains well 
equipped, especially in its air defense capabilities, and there are several regional allies 
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that Bashar Al-Assad can depend upon such as Iran and Hezbollah.1 What helped to 
hasten Gadhafi’s exit, was the fact that the Western forces could accomplish many of 
their objectives without needing to worry about a risk of involvement. To accomplish 
similar objectives in Syria, it would take a lot of destruction, a serious commitment of 
time and resources, calculated measures to weaken Assad’s military capabilities, and 
possibly even an invasion force.2   
There is also the problem that many different religious groups within Syria are in a 
contention for control. The Shia Alawi who is currently the minority group in power feel 
threatened by the Sunni majority. As Harvard Professor Stephen Walt describes, “Syria is 
a genuine ethical dilemma, if you stay out thousands of innocents will die. Yet if you 
choose to intervene you may have to slaughter the thousands who supported the regime. 
There is no automatic formula to come to the right choice here.” 3  
Intervening in Syria thus increases the complexity of the problem at hand. When a 
powerful nation drives towards its interests in highly destabilized region, it will likely 
increase the tensions between all the different groups which have interests in Syria, and 
above all else raises the stakes. This makes an intervention costly, lengthy, and increases 
the risks for failure.   
Not surprisingly the explanation of the first question has tied itself into the second 
question, as there are many more mechanisms behind the international community’s 
failures to implement an intervention in Syria. To answer the question “Why does Syria 
matter?”, and to further expand upon the points made answering the previous question, it 
is necessary to make note of why Syria has sparked so much interest from both regional 
and foreign actors.  
Beginning with the interests of the local actors, Syria is geographically centered in 
a regional rivalry for hegemonic power between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The sectarian war 
                                                          
1 “Syria: Why international action remains unlikely even as death toll rises,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
February 12, 2012 , 2 
2Ibid., 1-2 
3 Ibid.,2. 
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in Syria threatens the stability of both Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Israel is pursuing its 
interests in this conflict so that it can thwart Hezbollah’s operations.4 Turkey and Qatar 
very much have their own agenda when it comes to Syria, as they once partnered with the 
regime, but now find themselves preparing for a post-Assad Syria.5   
Secondly there are the interests of Iran, to whom the Syrian Regime is a long 
standing ally. Their thirty year old strategic alliance has been mutually beneficial in 
preventing the influence of the United States, Israel, and other Arab states from 
dominating the Middle East. Iran stands to lose much if the Assad regime were to fall; 
most notable is the strategic foothold Syria serves for Tehran in the Levant.6  
For the Western powers, Syria was never regarded as being a major strategic 
problem, as it could be managed by diplomacy. Bashar Al-Assad was seen as a willing 
reformer who would engage cooperatively with the West. Almost from the onset, when 
the collapse of the Soviet Union forced Syria to engage in more serious relations with the 
European Union, the strategy has always been to entangle Syria into a web of norms and 
agreements which formatted its behaviour.7 Yet as the crisis unfolded, it became ever 
more apparent that Assad was not a reformer, and the U.S. signalled to Assad that he 
must step down to further the progress of Syria.8 However from a Western standpoint, the 
timing of this crisis in Syria could not have been any worse.  
The Libyan intervention demonstrated that N.A.T.O. has a clear dependence upon 
American logistics and military capabilities in order to properly function. The European 
partners suffer from military operational deficiencies, and no military commanders in 
either Europe or N.A.T.O. felt committed to proceed in what was perceived as being a 
                                                          
4 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The Syrian Dilemma. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press), 2013: 6. 
5 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. (New York: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies), 2013: 107-112. 
6 Ibid., 123-125. 
7 Ibid., 151-153. 
8 Ibid., 156. 
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much longer campaign.9 Even the Obama administration seemed inclined to ignore the 
events unfolding in Syria, and felt the need to focus on other priorities. The optimism of 
the Arab Spring had worn off as it had produced lengthy and costly political transitions in 
Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and had also sparked a wave of Islam following in its wake, 
which challenges American interests. 10  
Western interests re-emerged in Syria, when it became evident that Assad had in 
his possession a large stockpile of chemical weapons. The threat that these weapons 
posed was so serious to American interests that in August 2012, President Obama stated 
the following, “We have made it very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players 
on the ground, that a red line for us is when we start seeing a whole bunch of these 
chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus.”11 
The fact that Obama has forcefully taken this hard stand in light of all the 
complications that enforcing such a statement entails, speaks volumes about how large 
the U.S. interests in Syria are and how they will not be ignored. To put this into further 
context, the U.S. is still reeling from the after effects of its incredible blunder in the Iraq 
War of 2003, and the entire nation is divided upon what parameters are necessary to 
execute a humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect. Some argue that a full 
scale intervention is necessary while others lie in favour of arming the rebels. Many wish 
to see the Assad Regime get toppled, but fear the possibility of Islamists groups taking 
power in Syria.12 Thus there remains a huge incentive for the United States to take action 
in Syria but far too few good options exist in how to procure these fundamental interests.   
The final foreign actors whom are making their presence felt are those of Russia 
and China, and both of these nations have been vigorously involved in preventing the 
U.N. Security Council from generating a mandate for intervention in Syria. These two 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 168. 
10 Ibid., 169. 
11 Ibid., 181. 
12 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The Syrian Dilemma. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press), 2013: 9-12. 
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key players have made it clear that they will not stand to tolerate an international system 
in which only some states are allowed to dictate the nature of the world order.13  Russia 
holds a lot more at stake in this conflict than does China. Syria and Russia have had 
historical relations dating back as far as the 1950s. Not only is Syria a strategic ally for 
Russia, but it also remains to be one of the very few footholds Moscow has in the Middle 
East. After losing another ally in Libya to a Western intervention, Russia has realized that 
if it wants to maintain its geographic influence, and deny the ability of the Western 
powers to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states, it must take a firm stand in Syria 
now.14    
All of the concerns listed represent only but a small sample of the interests that 
regional and foreign states hold in Syria. This brief description has demonstrated that to 
many international players, the Syrian War is of strategic importance. The most crucial 
point to take into account is the fact that by drawing a red line in Syria, the U.S. has 
willingly or otherwise forced itself into a position of commitment to the conflict. Syria 
matters because it is situated in a hotspot of continual geographic contention. Many 
different actors interpret Syria as being an opportunity to heighten their regional 
influence and to further their strategic goals. Consequently, the same reasons which make 
the Syria conflict important are the same reasons as to why it remains so different. The 
competing interests between both large and small states, coupled with the internal 
dynamics of the civil war, make an intervention either by a large state actor, or by the 
international community nearly impossible.  
Chapter 2. Exploring Theoretical Concepts and Strategies. 
2.1 America’s Changing Strategic Mindset. 
 There is no doubt that the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the United States 
to emerge as the dominating hegemon in the international system. This unequivocal 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 7-8. 
14 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. (New York: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2013):  172. 
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position of power had left strategists and policymakers with the struggle to take 
advantage of this newly acquired status. To retain this position, the United States’ 
strategic focus was on the maintenance of its power foundation, and to prevent 
competitor nations from taking hold of the international system.15  
Yet as history can explain, states who hold such influence over the international 
system struggle to maintain this position. This is because historically speaking; states that 
have held a similar position to that of the U.S. have learned that having more power 
makes a state less secure.16 For a state to hold power in the international system is a good 
thing, but there is always the risk of a state becoming too powerful, which will generate 
some unintended consequences. All states like to remain competitive with one another, 
but when one emerges as the clear dominating force, the other states will each fear for 
their safety.17As the infamous Henry Kissinger has stated, “Hegemonic empires almost 
automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such claimants sooner or later 
exhaust themselves.”18  
Thus the more the U.S. struggles to maintain its power structure and influence, the 
more other states will become fearful of its global reach and intentions. Christopher 
Layne argues that the Kosovo Intervention was the pivotal moment for when the 
international community became concerned about the implications of U.S. hegemonic 
power. The rise of an anti-American alliance emerged between rising states Russia, China 
and India. These three states were concerned that America’s efforts in Kosovo, would 
serve as the model for Washington to further violate and ignore important international 
norms.19 These concerns gained further credit during the Persian Gulf War, where 
America directly oversaw the security management of the Middle East through a “dual 
containment” strategy, aimed at isolating the two regional powers of Iran and Iraq. The 
                                                          
15 Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.2, (Spring 2002): 
237. 
16 Ibid., 237. 
17 Ibid., 237. 
18 Ibid., 237. 
19 Ibid., 240. 
14 
 
orchestration of this type of security strategy specific to one region highlighted America’s 
need to manage its strategic interests directly through its hegemonic claims.20  
The goal therefore of U.S. security strategy, should be to allow itself to continue to 
defend its interest unilaterally if necessary. Yet this cannot come at the expense of further 
exposing itself to unwanted counterhegemonic balancing initiatives from other states.21 
Clearly the primary goal of the U.S. is to manage its presumed security threats, in the 
ways Washington best sees fit. However, it is becoming more apparent that there needs to 
be a strategy implemented which minimizes the blowback and negativity that plagues 
such dominant state. Even when America feels threatened and is forced to take action in 
an intervention.  
2.2 Lessons From the Iraq War. 
 It has become painfully obvious that the Iraq invasion of 2003 is an unmitigated 
disaster for the United Sates. It was not the mistakes made during the war which 
ultimately cost the U.S. a victory, but rather the decision to go to war in the first place 
was mistakenly based on wrongful assumptions and unrealistic objectives.22 Yet some 
within Washington’s inner circle approve the action taken as being the moral and 
responsible thing to do. President Bush stated that Iraq was not a mistake, and that the 
objective was to bring about the removal of a brutal dictator and to replace it with a free 
and democratic Iraq.23 Seemingly though, invading Iraq with faulty aims in mind has 
caused the situation in the Middle East to become much more unstable.  
 In fact, Iraq has never fit the criteria necessary for being a successful transition 
state. There is no modern market based economy, there exists and abundance of hostile 
ethnic and religious groups, a vibrant civil society, a political culture that is hostile 
towards democratic principles, and furthermore, the Iraqi population never welcomed the 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 240. 
21 Ibid., 244. 
22 Christopher Layne, “Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters: The Case for Offshore Balancing.” World Policy 
Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Fall 2007): 38. 
23 Ibid., 39. 
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American occupation force.24 The prospects for developing a democracy in a setting 
which it never existed are challenging enough as it is, and Iraq should be considered even 
more of an unstable setting for this transition, given the fact that the country has an 
underdeveloped state structure which allows for the emergence of ethnic and sectarian 
tensions.25 
 The Bush Administration had been forewarned by the intelligence community 
about all these considerations and of the high probability of failure which would produce 
a messy post war Iraq.26 Yet despite all of these warnings, the invasion of Iraq proceeded 
as did the subsequent failure of the operation. The operation was doomed to be a disaster 
prior to the onset since the country never seemed stable enough to accept such a 
transition, and in no way matched any criteria which indicated otherwise. Layne argues 
that the lesson learned to learn from Iraq is not next time to do it right, but rather next 
time do not do it at all.27   
The Iraq War experience has had an adverse impact on America’s willingness to 
intervene in future democracy transitions, even in situations where vital interests are at 
stake. The Bush Administration’s misguided foreign expeditions have made any national 
security objectives, which can be considered ideological or moralistic in nature, subject to 
intense scrutiny, all for fear that the United States may enter in yet another quagmire.28 
Nonetheless, despite a military withdraw from the region, the United States does 
hold a limited position of influence within the Iraqi state. The slow but steady increase in 
Iraqi oil production, has allowed the U.S. to stabilize the regional oil markets. This 
provides the U.S. with an opportunity to further exert pressure on Iran’s oil economy, 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 39 
25 Ibid., 40. 
26 Ibid., 40. 
27 Ibid., 39. 
28 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., The Syrian Dilemma. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press), 2013:22-24. 
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without fear of damaging the flow of oil from the Gulf.29 Yet in order to keep this process 
working, the U.S. must balance its interests with that of Iraq, as the democratic process in 
Iraq is being threatened by the sectarian conflict in Syria. In order to ensure Iraq’s 
longevity, it must have the ability to maintain a position of neutrality, so as to minimize 
any potential hostilities with Syria and Iran.30  
The question now becomes what type of strategy would allow for America to best 
pursue its interests in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and in the region as a whole, while at the same 
time mitigating the risks posed to its own security?  
2.3 The Theory of Offshore Balancing 
 Offshore balancing strategy, as Christopher Layne describes, is a realist strategy 
which aims to capitalize on the strategic advantages that great powers possess. It is a 
realist strategy in the sense that it defines what the principle interests of great power 
states are, rather than what is considered to be desirable. It highly emphasizes the costs 
and benefits of decision making, along with the necessity to exercise restraint when 
needed.31 This strategy is beneficial to great powers in a variety of ways.  
First, it calls for the great power to refrain from upsetting the ongoing regional 
power balances, which generate stability and prevent rising powers from emerging. For 
the offshore balancing approach to function properly, it is imperative for the great power 
not to be prematurely engaged in confrontations. The great power can simply choose to 
remain on the sidelines during a contention between regional adversaries. When 
involvement becomes necessary, staying out of the conflict has allowed for the great 
power to decide upon the best opportunity for striking.32 The great power would have 
already observed the conflict prior to engagement, so it can accurately account for which 
                                                          
29 Denis B. Ross and James F. Jeffery, “Obama II and the Middle East: Strategic Objectives for U.S. Policy.” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy Washington D.C., Strategic Report 12, (March 2013): 19. 
30 Ibid., 19. 
31 Christopher Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: the Moment for Offshore Balancing Has 
Arrived.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, (January 2009): 8. 
32 Ibid., 10, 
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side it intends to support. Furthermore, the great power can maximize whatever benefits 
it receives from an alliance or relations with friendly states,  whom share similar interests 
in the contested region or are within a geographic proximity to the conflict.33 
Stephen Walt and C. Raja Mohan both touch upon this unique advantage that 
offshore balancing provides. Mohan explains that providing regional adversaries with the 
time and opportunity to engage with one another over a contestation, allows the great 
power to tip the balances when it deems it necessary to do so. If the great power remains 
in the center of the conflict, it will have limited opportunities to affect the outcome. This 
is because all the other players will be resisting the great power and balancing against it.34 
Stephen Walt explains how such a strategy furthers America’s national interests, as it 
would allow for the U.S. to take advantage of its geopolitical positioning as the hegemon. 
Walt argues that this strategy would be a cost effective means for America to manage 
future conflict setting and it would only have to intervene into areas where a balance was 
lost.35  
To build upon the argument of Mohan, Layne expresses that by refraining from 
the desire to deploy forces into contested territory, an offshore balancer can reap the 
rewards off the international system. Rival states will no longer be focused on the great 
power’s intrusion into the conflict setting, as they will be preoccupied with competing 
against one another. This system serves to benefit the greater powers, because the highly 
fractured relationships between the lesser powers do not provide them with the ability to 
come together and match the power of a great state. Thus, the great state holds a higher 
degree of power over the smaller states which are in a constant condition of quarrel with 
one another.36  
                                                          
33 Ibid., 10. 
34 Stephen Walt, “Offshore Balancing: An Idea Whose Time Has Come.” Foreign Policy Magazine, November 2011, 
accessed May 13, 2014. 
35Ibid. 
36 Christopher Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: the Moment for Offshore Balancing Has 
Arrived.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, (January 2009): 11. 
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What remains troubling for the U.S. is that the longer it remains on top of the scale 
of geopolitical primacy; it will continue to generate unwanted attention from other states 
that fear for their own safety when such a large and powerful actor is present. At the same 
time, rising powers such as China are becoming capable of challenging America’s hold 
on global power and it is becoming apparent that the days of U.S. supremacy are 
numbered.37 Furthermore, smaller states are using strategies such as soft balancing in 
order to mitigate the current control the U.S. holds on the international system. The 
attempts conducted by Germany, France, Russia and China to deny the United States 
U.N. Security Council approval for invading Iraq is one perfect example of how states are 
utilizing other methods other than hard power to limit the actions that the U.S. can take.38 
States which cannot engage in soft power methods to deny the U.S. opportunities to 
exploit the international system, must rely upon asymmetrical strategies such as state 
sponsored terrorism, or nuclear arms in order to deter the United States from taking 
action.39   
Currently as it stands the offshore balancing approach would allow the U.S to 
further enhance its means of settling Iran’s nuclear program. Rather than being forced to 
confront Iran militarily on this issue, by employing this strategy it would allow the U.S. 
to continue pursuing a diplomatic solution or a grand bargain.40 If only a military option 
is considered, much in the same nature that the Iraq invasion was conducted, it too would 
be doomed to failure for very much the same reasons.  The offshore balancing strategy 
seems to incorporate the lessons learned from the Iraq experience and seeks to capitalize 
on the gains made by engaging in the region from a distance. Offshore balancing 
provides an alternative avenue for diplomacy to function, and it provides the U.S. with 
options which do not require the use of force.  
                                                          
37 Ibid., 8-9. 
38 Ibid., 9. 
39 Ibid., 9. 
40 Christopher Layne, “Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters: The Case for Offshore Balancing.” World Policy 
Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Fall 2007): 43. 
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The world is becoming a multipolar system once again and if the U.S. intends to 
survive, it must be willing to work within a system which has shared control. Even a state 
as powerful as the United States must be willing to accept that inevitably great powers 
will rise. Layne argues that the only way forward is for the U.S. to adopt a non-
threatening posture towards other regions, and must refrain from pursing imperialistic or 
hegemonic goals.41 This is the type of strategic mindset offshore balancing employs in 
order to mitigate the negativity directed at a hegemonic state and provide it with the 
necessary means to ensure its survival in a multipolar world. Despite the decree for the 
United States to usher in a new era of global strategic management, it would not be the 
first instance where America has employed the use of offshore balancing as a means to 
define its greater strategic mindset.  
John Mearsheimer in his work titled “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” 
uncovers a series of historical accounts in which the United States utilized an offshore 
balancing strategy, in order to preserve its global power in a multipolar world. The most 
noticeable accounts of this are the U.S. policies in Europe during the First and Second 
World Wars. Mearsheimer explains that according to the theory of offensive realism, it 
would be in America’s best interest to dominate all corners of the globe, upon achieving 
the level of primacy in 1850-1900. During this time it was essential for global powers to 
remain protected and a state could never have enough security, becoming larger and more 
powerful was the only means to absolutely ensure state survival.42  
Yet as Mearsheimer unveils, the American mindset was actually quite the 
opposite. The U.S. instead focused on maintaining its strategic placement within the 
Western hemisphere and relied upon the European powers to check and balance their 
own continent, which would prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon. With the 
outbreak of the First World War, the U.S. relied on the Triple Entente Alliance to restrict 
German expansion. When this strategy ultimately failed and it became apparent that 
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Germany was powerful enough to dominate Europe, only then did America decide to 
send its military. This was done for the purposes of denying Germany a victory, so as to 
remove its great power status.43 When the war ended, American forces did not stay in 
Europe and hold claim to the lands, but America withdrew rather quickly from the 
European theatre, and sunk into a period of isolationism. Even when it became apparent 
that World War Two was inevitable, America refrained from sending forces to Europe 
once again, and instead relied upon the region’s makeup to create a system of power 
balance.44 
Mearsheimer’s work has shown how the exercise of constraint over not achieving 
domination, allows the U.S. to maintain its power status during times of intense conflict. 
Relying upon traditional balance of power methods, permits great states to develop a non-
threatening posture, which is essential to their prolonged survival. When the time comes 
necessary for the great state to intervene in order to thwart the rise of another power, they 
can rely upon other regional actors to weaken the rising adversary, while they bide their 
time and wait for the critical moment to deliver the striking blow.  
The main aims of the offshore balancing strategy are all driven towards the 
maximization of state power, while reducing the costs involved. Another strategy which 
compliments and often serves the purposes of offshore balancing is that of wedge 
strategies.  
2.4 The Use of Wedge Strategies in Relation to America’s Grand Strategy. 
Seeing as how wedge strategies have a noticeable role in shaping how large and 
powerful states seek to maximize their strength. It is necessary to further examine the role 
wedge strategies have within the Syrian War and also how they better serve the purposes 
of America’s grand strategy. Timothy Crawford a wedge strategy theorist defines it as 
being, a state’s attempt to break up, prevent, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance 
at an acceptable cost. The dividing state can gain a great advantage when using this 
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strategy, as it reduces the number of opponents it faces, and it can also generate huge 
power shifts by turning rivals into neutral parties or even allies.45   
There exist essentially two different methods of how sates use wedge strategies, 
the first is through reinforcing wedge strategies, which encourages a target to do what 
they would normally do. The second is countervailing wedge strategies, which asks an 
opponent to do something that otherwise would not be done. Countervailing attempts are 
not as successful, but they are the most capable in terms of altering the current power 
structure.46 When it comes to dividing adversaries, states rely upon selective 
accommodation and confrontation strategies. Crawford argues that when a wedge 
strategy is utilized for the purposes of countervailing opponents, states will likely pursue 
selective accommodation over confrontation, because it has a higher degree of success.47  
There exists much controversy over when it is appropriate for states to select 
accommodation over confrontation. Yasuhiro Izumikawa, another scholar of wedge 
strategies, inducts that when states cannot exert influence over their adversaries, they will 
have nothing to gain by using selective accommodation methods of wedging.48   
Selective accommodation strategies require a divider to approach an opponent 
with a mix of sticks and carrots, or rewards and penalties, in order to create divergent 
pressures on members of an opposing alliance. It specifically aims to lure one intended 
target away from the group of other rivals, whom are dealt with in a much different 
manner. 49 To be successful, countervailing strategies which utilize a selective 
accommodation approach must satisfy three criteria; these being the incentive provided 
by the divider towards the intended target must be considered by the opponent to be an 
area of interest, the divider must only have influence and not exclusive control over the 
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benefits which the target is to receive, and lastly the other rivals must not be capable of 
presenting a viable alternative for the intended target, or be capable of outbidding the 
divider.50  
If successful, the countervailing strategies will effectively break the opposing 
alliance, as the intended target will be encouraged to remain neutral or separate from the 
hostile alliance. Furthermore, the reward system can aggravate old or existing tensions 
between members of the opposing alliance, and with the use of the selective 
accommodation strategy, the threat posed by the divider remains well hidden.51  
According to Crawford, when a confrontation strategy is utilized it is intended for 
one specific purpose, and this is to expose any weakness in the opposing alliance. By 
demonstrating power and intimidation, the dividing state hopes to generate an internal 
panic within the hostile alliance. This makes each member fear for their own interests and 
limits their abilities to cooperate, which ultimately results in alliance breakdown.52 This 
strategy will be successful so long as one member remains weak, and is capable of 
breaking from the alliance. However, more often than not, confrontation strategies will 
pit the divider squarely against the alliance and allow for no room to manoeuvre with 
concessions. The direct threat creates further justification for the opposing forces to 
unify, which in turn strengthens the alliance. This results in a blowback situation for the 
divider where they now face a much stronger opposition force, which is highly fused in 
its cause. The main incentive for dividing states is to avoid confrontation strategies, 
unless it can accurately determine that the strength of the opposing alliance is weak, and 
that their combined strength would not pose a significant threat.53 
When assessing how wedge strategies impact international relations, Crawford 
indicates that wedge strategies can be utilized for either defensive or offensive purposes. 
These two intentions provide both powerful and small states, with a means to capitalize 
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from a power balancing system. Defensive wedge strategies serve as the preferred means 
to break up aggressors, and to isolate and weaken threatening parties.54  In particular, 
defensive strategies allow small states to employ soft balancing measures, which helps 
explain why for many states, defensive wedging remains one of the preferred methods of 
strategic balancing. Since a nation like the U.S. holds a vast network of alliances across 
the globe, and has an overdeveloped armed forces, smaller states that are involved in an 
altercation with the U.S., must seek out other means to maintain the balance of power. 
These states focus on isolating the U.S. or some of its allies, in order to break the strength 
of American power in the international system. Any adversary to the U.S. is well aware 
that it cannot rival America’s military power, nor can it compete with vast alliance 
network. Thus utilizing defensive wedge strategies remains the most effective means to 
balance against the U.S.55 
Conversely, states which are targeted by defensive wedging can develop offensive 
wedge strategies which aim to break apart counterbalancing alliances. The costs of 
balancing against a great power state produce a system known as buck passing, where 
each state inside the alliance attempts to offset the costs of matching the collective threat, 
by passing the responsibility onto another state.56 Offensive wedge strategies aim to 
capitalize on this inherent weakness of defensive alliances.   
Crawford argues that the primary means available for offensive minded wedge 
strategists is to utilize selective accommodation. This will divide the defensive alliance in 
either two ways. The first is through the nature of the alliance itself. It is vulnerable to 
fragmentation based on the domestic factors of each state involved, and the conditions of 
the alliance and how it operates. For instance, if there is a condition which calls for 
collective action against the intended target, it is possible that not all actors would agree 
on the necessity for collective action.57 The second is by means of bribes and incitements, 
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coupled with a threat that the opposing power has already placed on the counterbalancing 
alliance, which causes its collapse. Crawford highlights the example given by Richard 
Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, in which these authors argue that the main reason why 
Napoleon could not be counterbalanced. Through use of an elaborate system of bribes 
and bullying, and by emphasising the sheer threat that France posed to every nation, 
Napoleon successfully thwarted every attempt from Europe to collectively act against 
him.58 For this reason, offensive wedge strategies aim to maintain the status quo because 
it is likely that the counterbalancing alliance will be forced to break apart, due to its 
inherent structural flaws. Therefore as Crawford asserts, it is in the best interests of the 
powerful state to reinforce the current state of affairs and not to engage in countervailing 
measures, as it will likely produce the same outcome but would risk further 
confrontation.59    
This necessity for a great power to maintain an unthreatening posture and to not 
press with a show of force when confronted by a hostile of counterbalancing alliance, is 
reflected in the offshore balancing approach. However when a great power is challenged 
by an opposition, in which it has little means to enact upon an accommodation strategy, 
what alternative measures can allow for a great power to place further duress upon a 
target state or alliance? To answer this question, it is now appropriate to consider the 
argument laid forth by Yasuhiro Izumikawa. 
Izumikawa argues that coercive wedge strategies are a viable form of statecraft, 
despite the arguments laid forth by Crawford indicating that reward strategies are more 
successful. Izumikawa stresses that when a state faces a credible security threat coming in 
the form of another alliance, and yet it has little influence or means to divide a target, it 
must rely on coercive wedging in order to thwart the unfriendly alliance. Furthermore, he 
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stresses that Crawford has overlooked some of complexities that arise, which form a 
state’s decision to utilize either an accommodation or a confrontation approach.60  
As Crawford has explained, accommodation type strategies are often more 
beneficial than confrontation ones, as they do not highly risk generating a counter wedge 
strategy known as balancing blowback. Although Izumikawa agrees with Crawford on 
this point, he argues that coercive actions cannot be simply ruled out of the equation 
because they incorporate a certain amount of risk. Only a coercive or confrontational type 
of wedge strategy will be able to highlight crucial insecurities, which plague the alliance 
a divider sate is targeting.61 By striking at these key insecurities, the divider can 
essentially force a target state to fear the risk of entrapment within the alliance, which 
could yield a beneficial outcome as it makes the target state feel more insecure.  
Furthermore, if the divider state remains firm on a target state which is not 
currently part of the hostile alliance, the divider can dissuade the target state from joining 
the alliance in the future by pressuring it.62 It should also be noted that these hard line 
strategies will produce ripple effects as third party observes may be motivated to remain 
neutral and not join the alliance after having observed how much pressure has been 
exerted by the divider state over the target state when it attempted to join the alliance.63   
 Even if a coercive strategy does produce balancing blowback, the strategy can still 
limit the target’s relationship with the alliance over the long run. If the divider does not 
have much influence on the target state, it can utilize the pressure generated through the 
coercive strategy as a means to offer a concession to the target state. This is done by 
exchanging a reduction in coercive pressure for an increase in cooperation or a desired 
behaviour.64 Moreover, having witnessed how important the issue is to the divider, and 
how much turmoil had been generated by the divider pursing a coercive strategy, the 
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target may refrain from engaging in such action in the future.65 By inducing such 
pressures on the target state, coercive strategies will force the target to become trapped in 
a dilemma as to how it should respond. The target can request that it alliance partners 
come to its aid, and depending on their response or lack of, this could disrupt the security 
apparatus of the alliance by reinforcing the fears of entrapment or that the partners do not 
have the best interests of the target state in mind.   
 Izumikawa’s work further establishes that coercive wedge strategies can often be 
successful in dismantling threatening alliances, especially when the divider has little 
influence or concessions to offer which are of any value to the intended target. The 
negative consequences of coercive strategies can be offset by the relative gains it makes 
on dismantling an opponent’s alliance. Even if the gains are modest, coercive strategies 
still allow the divider to employ an array of economic and political pressures, which put 
strain on the alliance and can allow for future negotiations or behavioural changes.66  
 Given the fact that Crawford’s theories on wedge strategies emphasize the need 
for a powerful nation like the United States to maintain a low threatening posture in order 
to maximize gains, is it feasible for the United States to take coercive action where 
necessary? Izumikawa argues yes, and the use of coercive strategies can often benefit the 
U.S. in regions where it does not hold much sway or political clout.  
What the combined works of Crawford and Izumikawa have demonstrated is that 
in order for wedge strategies to be successful, it is necessary for a powerful state such as 
the U.S. to act in ways which can appear to be threatening towards some actors and 
catering towards others. This is especially true in situations where there exist multiple 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 504. 
66 Izumikawa largely bases his findings on a case study based on the American Administrations of Truman and 
Eisenhower and their foreign policy approach towards the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Izumikawa finds that Truman relied 
much upon the same strategy that Crawford has defined as the more cost effective approach which resulted in the 
U.S. accepting the status quo. Under Eisenhower however, the U.S. was able to employ a strategy which helped to 
diminish the strength of the alliance. Izumikawa argues that the coercive approach that Eisenhower utilized was 
instrumental in producing this outcome as it was able to capitalize on the rivalry and some of the internal 
weakness of this alliance. Although Izumikawa does agree with Crawford that selective accommodation strategies 
are often more applicable, he stresses that one cannot rule out the importance coercive wedge strategies hold 
within international relations theory. Ibid., 530. 
27 
 
targets, which have their own geopolitical and strategic goals. Nonetheless, when a nation 
as large and as powerful as the U.S. feels that it national interests are clearly being 
threatened in a conflict, it has the full right to defend these interests. In fact this is what 
the offshore balancing strategy reiterates. The working aspects of coercive wedge 
strategies and the offshore balancing approach are made clearer through an observation of 
U.S. policy in the Middle East region in regards to Iran. A brief but effective overview of 
what America’s interests are in the conflict when compiled with evidence indicating a 
need to break Iran’s critical influence, will serve as an appropriate means to further 
illustrate this point.  
 As U.S. Ambassador R. James Woolsey acknowledged in his congressional 
testimony on April 11, 2013, that Iran and Syria have been regional allies for decades. 
Currently as it stands, Syria remains a critical component of the Iranian security network, 
and it remains the only avenue for Tehran to directly supply Hezbollah. North Korea has 
also developed a stark interest in this conflict as well, utilizing it to conceal its own 
ambitions of countering American efforts to dominate the region, more specifically in its 
aims to provide both countries with nuclear capabilities. China and Russia also remain 
important providers for both Syria and Iran and not only for weapons, as China remains 
one of the premier transshipping points for Iranian exports.67 For Syria, Iran provides the 
means subsidize arms contracts between the regime and Russia. Syria then returns the 
favour by outfitting the different factions of Hezbollah, along with its own armed forces 
with modern military equipment from Russia.68 The elaborate trading network thus poses 
a great security threat to the United States and its global partners, not just because of the 
threat an armed and capable Hezbollah carries, but also the real consequences and game 
changing dynamics a nuclear armed Syria and Iran could impose on the Middle East.  
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 Woolsey expresses that the U.S. objective in Syria is simple and straightforward, 
and that is to break apart this linkage between Iran, Syria and North Korea. The main 
strategic goal is to separate Assad from Syria, and if Assad’s Regime does fall, it would 
be a great loss to Iran, as it loses its primary ability to fund Hezbollah. Furthermore by 
separating Iran and Syria, the U.S. could achieve greater isolation of Iran allowing it to 
exert more pressure on its economy. Woolsey advocates that by arming the opposition 
and taking a lead role in this manner, combined with further economic sanctions imposed 
onto Syria, and freezing financial assets of the Assad family, the United States could 
essentially break this alliance.69    
 Syria does present itself as the weaker link in this alliance. With the correct 
amount of pressure exerted by the U.S., it could take advantage of the failing domestic 
situation in Syria, and separate Iran from a key regional ally. Yet achieving such an 
objective is not an easy process for America. Syrian and American relations have been in 
a steady decline since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Syria was highly critical of the U.S. 
motives for invasion and has helped fuel the sectarian violence and has made efforts to 
set back America’s advancement in Iraq by providing refuge to foreign fighters and 
allowing a free flow of insurgents across the border.70  
It is certain that America has little clout in Syria’s regional mindset. In order to 
divide Syria and Iran, the U.S. must rely heavily upon coercive strategies in order to 
exploit Syria’s weakened position. Since Syria and Iran cannot directly challenge U.S. 
coercive power in the region, as they do not have the necessary capabilities to deter 
American involvement, the United States can afford to adopt a rather eased approach to 
exercising some of its coercive capabilities. Utilizing economic sanctions and supporting 
the Syrian opposition as a means to dismantling the Assad Regime fits well into the 
offshore balancing strategy. Furthermore, by implementing a wedge strategy such as this, 
it further fits the purposes of America’s grand strategy, by denying two regional actors 
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from emerging with capabilities that could threaten the balancing dimensions of the 
Middle East.  
Even with such a small example of how this regional conflict carries global 
implications, the ways in which offshore balancing and wedge strategies help further the 
objectives of American grand strategy becomes more fathomable. What has been the 
stark undertone of this chapter is that great and powerful states such as the U.S., will not 
tolerate the emergence of other hegemonic competitors or rivals who wish to destabilize 
the balance of power system. Although the offshore balancing strategy does allow for a 
multipolar system, it does not accept a system without power balance.  The hegemon 
must take action to restore the balance of power once the scales of power have been tilted 
in a regional conflict. What wedge strategies provide to the American grand strategy are 
more avenues to exploit their position of power over regional adversaries, to ensure that 
they cannot collectively gain the upper hand. Thus offshore balancing theory and wedge 
strategies do complement one another in the sense that they both seek to ensure that the 
large state remains the most dominant actor, and they both allow for a variety of different 
means to ensure that this condition remains constant.  
2.5 Coercive Diplomacy as a Means of Exercising Offshore Balancing. 
 The final theoretical concept which will be discussed is that of coercive 
diplomacy.  I deem it to be one of the central mechanisms through which the offshore 
balancing strategy can be applied. Since offshore balancing is a far-reaching approach for 
managing a large state’s security objectives, it is necessary to narrow down the focus 
slightly and provide a series or set of conditions in which a diplomatic track of offshore 
balancing can be successfully utilized. This is exactly what coercive diplomacy intends to 
offer to this study. Since to this date there has been no upscale military action or 
intervention taken in Syria. One can only deduce that driving for a diplomatic solution 
remains the primary avenue for which the U.S. will continue to pursue its interests in the 
conflict.  
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 To analyse the characteristics of coercive diplomacy and the means in which it is 
used, it is appropriate to turn to the works of Alexander George. I his work titled 
“Forceful Persuasion”, George describe coercive diplomacy as a strategy which is taken 
by policy makers in order to reach a peaceful solution to a serious dispute.71 To secure a 
peaceful and diplomatic settlement, coercive diplomacy requires three fundamental 
components. These being a firm demand, which is matched by the presentation or 
exertion of force and a set timeline for compliance. The intent behind issuing a demand is 
that it is to halt an opponent from continuing a course of action, or which may occur in 
the imminent future. The threat or show of force helps to reinforce the demand and 
reassures the target that if the demand is not met, consequences will follow. Time is the 
final and perhaps the most critical component, as it backs the two previous acts. It is not 
sufficient in itself to present to an opponent a demand, accompanied with a show of force 
which holds no set timeframe for compliance. Furthermore, the element of time heightens 
the sense of urgency for an opponent and thus increases the amount of pressure an 
opponent feels.72  
The real trick behind coercive diplomacy is for an initiator to successfully present 
to the target a credible threat, which the target deems to be a substantial penalty for 
noncompliance. This in turn, forces the target to give into the demand. The purpose is to 
not beat an opponent senselessly for crossing a line, or to solicit a strong set of demands, 
but rather to persuade an opponent that compliance is in their best interests.73 This 
strategy is separate from deterrence, as deterrence is exercised for the purpose of 
preventing an opponent from taking action. Coercive diplomacy specializes in preventing 
an opponent from continuing to act in this unfavourable way once an action has taken 
place. Once an opponent has taken action, the deterrence strategy has failed and can no 
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longer be of any use, yet a coercive diplomacy method can still function under these 
circumstances.74   
The methods for persuading an opponent are usually styled around bargaining, 
signalling, and negotiation. When carried out in such a manner, persuasion techniques 
will provide the target with an opportunity to weight their options, and step aside or back 
away from the action before the initiator has a chance to strike. As George highlights, the 
methods of persuasion remain an attractive strategy for policy makers, because it can 
allow for the achievement of strategic objectives without reliance upon swift military 
measures.75 Such tactics require little economic investment, reduce the risk of escalating 
the crisis, lowers the psychological and political costs of commitment to a strategic 
objective, and allow for a continued system of dialogue between the initiator and 
opponent.76  
Alexander George further exhibits that coercive diplomacy, much like wedge 
strategy, can allow for a carrots and sticks and selective accommodation approaches. 
Building on the efforts of the persuasion technique, the initiator can gain an even greater 
advantage by offering an incentive for compliance, which would further drive the target 
towards a mindset of cooperation.77 Yet just as in wedge strategy, pursuing a demand 
which is in the strategic interest of the target, will likely not yield a positive agreement.  
If an initiator is made aware of what the target deems to be important, then they 
can take full advantage of the persuasion and accommodation tactics. The initiator must 
also be fully aware of the physiological and political costs that the target will face when 
giving into such a demand and the demand must be reflective of this.78Another crucial 
element is the ability of the initiator to properly convey and demonstrate to the target, the 
severity of the devastating actions that will follow if compliance is not met. If the target 
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has reason to believe that the threat will be followed through with its utmost ability, then 
it will feel a greater need for compliance.79  
Furthermore, once an initiator has begun to utilize a coercive diplomacy strategy, 
they also develop a commitment to seeing this strategy through as they have undoubtedly 
assumed some cost in pursuing such a strategy. Reputation, motivation pride, identity, 
and prestige all play a vital role in determining the commitment factor of the initiator. 
This makes it difficult for the initiator resist taking immediate action once the adversary 
has turned town the demand.80    
It is also appropriate to discuss some of the factors which limit the chances for the 
coercive diplomatic approach to be successful. Firstly, the level of provocation in the 
crisis determines the effect coercive diplomacy can have on managing the situation. If an 
incident is minor, then the action can be easily reversed. Yet if the action taken by the 
opponent is so large and damaging, then it is likely that coercive diplomacy will fail.81 
The second consideration is that applying pressure and coercive tactics on a target state 
can be easily accomplished if the state has no surrounding allies or alliance partners. 
Consequently, if the target state has many partners who are willing to provide military, 
economic and political support, it increases the means for which the target state can resist 
the initiator.82 Lastly, if the initiator lacks the support of its citizens, or if the country is 
unwilling to go to war or enforce the demand, then the initiator cannot establish a 
credible threat.83  
Of course the measure for success or failure of coercive diplomacy is not solely 
determined by the presence of these variant factors. For coercive diplomacy to be 
successful, much of it relies upon the nature of the demand made, along with how 
strongly inclined the adversary feels towards accepting an offer for compliance. If the 
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demand is quite substantial, then the initiator can expect little to be achieved. In contrast 
if little is requested by the initiator or the demand is accompanied by accommodations, 
then consequently this will allow for a more positive agreement. Thus as George 
underlines, coercive diplomacy will be much more successful if the initiator sticks to a 
demand which is only structured around their immediate interest.84 If secondary or even 
multiple objectives are throw in with the initial demand, then the target will feel the costs 
of compliance are too heavy to burden. So long as the initiator holds reasonable 
expectations as to what the coercive approach can yield, then it is likely that the two 
parties will converge on an agreement.   
Coercive diplomacy corresponds nicely with the methods of both offshore 
balancing and wedge strategy. Given the fact that many different state actors are present 
in the Syria War, the situation in itself does not leave many options for American 
involvement. Thus America must seek to capitalize upon whatever strategic gains it can 
broker between all of its rivals that are involved in the conflict. Coercive diplomacy 
allows for an alternative approach to for states to further their interests in conflicts. It also 
provides a tool for which offshore balancing and wedge strategies can utilize in unison 
with one another. The combined approaches, allow the U.S. to structure its grand strategy 
around a system which seeks to maximize the benefits of remaining detached from a 
conflict.  
By building on key alliances, and having the capabilities to thwart rival alliances, 
the U.S. can maintain its dominating position of power. Accepting a multipolar 
international system allows for a world of stable balancing, in which the U.S. can easily 
maintain their posture, without succumbing to the harmful effects of counterhegemonic 
balancing. Lastly when there is a need for America to be present in a conflict setting, 
much like the situation in Syria today, the U.S. can deliver upon its security aims by 
cooperating with other states and engaging with its adversaries in diplomatic measures. 
Chapter 3. Theoretical Conception and Research Methods 
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3.1 Presenting the Theoretical Model 
 What has been outlined in the previous chapter is a composition of the major 
conceptual elements that focus on the shifting of American strategic thinking. These 
theoretical approaches describe how the U.S. can maximize its effectiveness from a 
power balancing system. Given the fact that great powers will generate 
counterhegemonic effects, it is in the primary interests of the U.S. to act in a manner 
which diminishes these countermeasures. Furthermore, as Iraq has demonstrated, it is 
imperative that the U.S. act in forceful ways only when its interests are directly 
threatened.  
 Therefore the theoretical model I intend to put forth reflects this development. The 
theoretical model and corresponding empirical analysis, will aim to establish that the 
world is once again becoming a multipolar system, and it will do this by focusing on a 
number of causal mechanisms, which have influenced America’s response and efforts. It 
will also emphasize that the U.S. is employing measures which are inherent to all three 
previous discussed theories, in order to make gains on its strategic interests. 
 The aim of this research is to test if these theories do hold a presence within the 
American strategic mindset, as it relates to Syria. Upon collective evidence on how 
influential these theories have been in securing American interests in Syria, it will then be 
possible to test how representative these theories are of America’s grand strategy.  I 
emphasize that coercive diplomacy is the instrument in which the offshore balancing 
approach manages the region and protects America’s immediate security interests, and 
that wedge strategies form the basis of America’s global grand strategy. 
 The starting point of this theoretical model is to elaborate on the conception that 
the United States primarily acts in its own interests. That being said it seems logical that 
the U.S. would be reluctant to step into a conflict zone, when it has very few immediate 
security interests within the dispute. To be active in a small conflict where very few 
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interests are present, would contradict the goal of remaining isolated from the 
contestation, so as to reap the benefits of the natural balance of power. Even with the 
presence of many actors in a conflict setting, to merely challenge the interests of other 
states is an insufficient means for America to further its involvement.  
What further deters U.S involvement in a conflict is when many other actors 
become involved and are willing to fight over their particular interests at hand. 
Championing for power and influence in setting becomes too atrocious, even for such a 
large and powerful state. In such a situation, the U.S. would most likely allow for the 
status quo. It would favour a power balancing system that allows for continuing conflict 
between its allies and adversaries, so that the U.S. could maximize its gains and minimize 
the subsequent risk of failure that intervention entails. In fact, as the theory of offshore 
balancing puts forth, it is likely that when confronted by this scenario, the U.S. would 
best be served by only engaging in the conflict to maintain a power balance. This would 
ensure that no state gained an upper hand in the quarrel.  
It is likely that when engaging in a conflict zone, the U.S. will generate a 
considerable amount of blowback from the other states which are involved in the conflict 
as well. Even for the actors whom are considered to be allied with the U.S., they too may 
be weakened from further U.S. involvement, as many of the groups which provide 
regional support for their preferred actor, may not tolerate a U.S. presence. Although it is 
a very powerful state, the U.S. cannot effectively manage all of its interests globally as it 
is weakened by its own posture atop of the global podium.       
 The single determinant for U.S. to enact in a conflict setting, remains to be when a 
threat emerges that can directly damage their security interests. Yet it may refrain from 
acting in forceful manners so as to avoid the counterhegemonic penalties of engaging 
directly with military force. Thus if the diplomatic option exists, America will likely 
pursue this option, as it will allow for it to secure its immediate interest. Such a policy 
favours rewards that come with a low risk of involvement and with a lesser monetary cost 
than an armed invasion. America’s strength can also be its weakness, as it relies on its 
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power and global reach to influence any manner of conflict, no matter the location. Yet in 
order to maintain its global influence, it must rely heavily upon its regional partners and 
proactively engage with the world, so as to not risk generating counterhegemonic effects. 
By limiting its unilateral capabilities, allows America to remain dominant and also 
permits it to isolate states that are considered to be rivals. This policy is essential for 
maintaining power balance and minimizing the negative costs attributed to being the 
global power.   
 Pursuing a strategy which epitomises an offshore balancing mindset further helps 
the process of diplomatic settlement in a conflict. When the U.S. acts upon its interest in 
a forceful manner, it raises the stakes for all the other players involved in the conflict and 
limits the capabilities of states to offer concessions with one another. When one state acts 
forcefully to secure its interest, it sets the tone for the other actors to engage in the same 
manner to secure their individual aims. Therefore, the U.S. acting in such a manner will 
only increase the likelihood that other states will respond, in fear of losing over their 
interests. Pursuing a policy which downplays the use of force will strengthen the resolve 
for the diplomatic process. In turn, this further reduces tensions between the different 
actors, which can downplay the escalation of the conflict and reduces the risk of the U.S. 
becoming entrapped.  
 Allowing for a diplomatic process to take course will further strengthen the 
capabilities of wedge strategies when selective accommodation type strategies are 
necessary. If coercive means are already implemented, then it will reduce the potential 
for a diplomatic solution to emerge. If coercive tactics are necessary, based on lack of 
influence that the great power has with the target state, it can still benefit from a 
diplomatic course, so long as the coercive strategies taken have not involved military 
measures. For instance if sanctions are applied by the great power on the target state in 
order to strike a behavioural change, the diplomatic effort can be strengthen, as these 
sanctions provide the basis to begin a negotiated settlement. None of this is attainable if 
the great power relies solely upon military means to manage conflicts. 
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 Another key element which can limit the course of action the America can take is 
the internal dimensions of the conflict itself. When a domestic situation is highly 
fractured, such as the one being witnessed in Syria today, the U.S. has an opportunity to 
influence certain groups and to aid in their ascension to power. Yet the ideological 
contention between vast arrays of players makes the process of projecting one group’s 
ascendency over the others quite a difficult task. In fact, the more involved the U.S. 
becomes with some of these groups, the more the local population will act in ways which 
run counterproductive to the interests of the United States.  
This phenomenon is discussed at great length by Mark L. Haas, where he asserts 
that shifts in power between conflicting ideological groups in a domestic context create 
profound international effects.85 Haas claims that the U.S. holds a stake in domestic 
contentions for power, when one or more political fractions support their ideological 
beliefs. To expand upon this argument, the U.S. does hold an obligation for supporting 
these select groups, but only so long as they have a measurable amount of power within 
the local population and are endorsed by a significant proponent. If these conditions are 
not present and yet the U.S. does share ideological similarities with political fractions that 
lack domestic support, it is unlikely that the U.S. will pursue any action which would 
strengthen this group’s resolve to take control. There would be a high cost compiled with 
a high probability of failure, and there would be no benefit for the U.S. to pursue this type 
of action. Yet as Haas reassures in his theoretical approach, the higher the contestation 
for power in a domestic situation, the more interest there is for external powers to 
intervene. The reward is that in such situations, the external actor whom wishes to gain 
favour with these ideological groups, can in fact influence key events and outcomes, so 
long as there remains a high level of domestic power in flux.86  
However with this argument, and with the case of the Syrian War, I will assert that 
when there is a high level of political and civil fragmentation in such a vital region and in 
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a country which holds the interest of many actors, the more difficult it becomes for states 
to influence their ideological partners. When so many groups find themselves in a 
contestation for power, and all varieties of ideological affiliations are put forth by 
different political fractions, one finds that many foreign actors now have some claim to 
the managing of Syria’s domestic situation. These different groups all believe that they 
have a right to power and their combined strength alone is capable of making the regime 
yield its authority. Yet because of their individual ideological hostility towards one 
another, and suspicion of each other’s aims, makes it difficult for these fractions to share 
power, and collaborate with one another.  
This is made further complex when going back to a previous notion that the 
presence of a foreign actor collaborating with certain groups over others, will drive the 
other fractions of the local population to undermine the aims of the foreign actor. This 
notion is also touched upon by Haas, where he notes that in such situations where one 
foreign actor provides benefits to only some and not all domestic parties, it is likely that 
the local population will sway its support from the group which is receiving foreign aid. 
They would deem it to be a traitor, or acting in the interests of foreign powers. Such an 
outcome will not benefit the situation and in fact will help to legitimize the efforts of the 
regime. The regime could bolster its internal strength, by declaring that it is the advocate 
of nationalism and identity and is resisting the foreign powers.87  
This notion becomes entirely problematic for the United States, as it would be in 
favour of supporting the Syrian opposition, but doing so comes at a substantial risk. Thus 
one finds that America’s options in Syria are very limited. The only way that foreign 
powers can minimize the risks associated to direct involvement within domestic 
contestations, is to adopt strategies which allow for influence in indirect and unobtrusive 
ways, such as those found in stick and carrot strategies, or selective accommodation.88  
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In order to make use of such a situation, the foreign power must hold significant 
leverage over the target state both in the form of economic and military reach. These 
assets can be used in either positive or negative ways, but aim mostly to drive a wedge 
between the different competing groups. These wedges can come in a variety of forms 
such as managing economic incentives, providing humanitarian aid, trade, and security 
agreements in order to reinforce behaviour and in order to change it, more coercive 
tactics such as bankrolling and assassinating specific leaders can be implemented.89 This 
provides the foreign power with a means to reward those whom favour their ideological 
desires and to exert pressure on those whom do not share similar views.90 Utilizing such 
methods promotes a behavioural response from domestic fractions and detracts all parties 
from engaging in unfavourable ways, so as to be rewarded for their actions. Thus the U.S. 
can influence a highly political fragmented Syria without having to risk backlash from 
the local population, as it would not be seen as capturing the revolution from them.  
It seems as though the more distant the U.S. projects itself from the conflict the 
more apparent the room for maneuvering becomes. By not becoming hastily involved in a 
conflict setting, the U.S. can maximize hegemonic resources to their fullest potential. The 
U.S. can rely upon selective accommodation and coercive strategies to influence key 
events and target specific outcomes, while remaining on the sidelines far away from the 
fray. Essentially as this theoretical model emboldens, the best incentive for the U.S. is to 
limit its direct involvement in the conflict, in order to mitigate the risks associated with 
intervening. However, it can still effectively influence events in the conflict, by means of 
utilizing its selective accommodation and coercive resources to their fullest extent. 
Smaller, regional adversaries must engage directly with a conflict to protect their 
interests, but the offshore balancer has the distinct advantage of not having to play the 
same game.     
3.2 The Process Tracing Method 
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 Since the developments in Syria are unique and very recent occurrences, it 
necessary to foster a qualitative analysis which investigates how a series of casual 
mechanisms, occurring within a specific sequence, ultimately determine the course of 
action for U.S. involvement. The fact that the Syrian War is still an ongoing process and 
has yet to be determined, makes conducting a scientific study on it a rather difficult feat. 
Compiling on this problem further, is that there is no means to provide values or 
measurement to the variables. Syria is very much an outlier when compared to other 
cases which have experienced interventions, as it does not fit to a particular category. In 
order to further understand Syria’s significance, and the implications this case carries for 
understanding developments in international relations, it is necessary to engage with 
Syria in a qualitative study. This will allow for all dynamics of the conflict to be given 
their due notice.  
 In order to achieve this outcome, this research design will rely heavily upon 
contextual evidence and deductive logic to reconstruct causality within this case. This 
method of analysis is what John Gerring refers to as process tracing, “in which multiple 
types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference”.91  Gerring 
notes that individual observations are not comparable, and usually result in the researcher 
developing a long causal chain, in order to deduce how the causal variable of interest 
influences the outcome. This is essential for single case study research, which produces 
inferences based upon observations. In the natural world it is not always possible to 
replicate scenarios for the purposes of generating treatment and control cases for the 
variables of interest, while all other variables remain constant. Furthermore due to the 
nature of observational studies, there is a number of confounding causal factors which 
cannot be separated by the research design.92 Thus such case study research warrants a 
process tracing method.   
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 When constructing social scientific research it is appropriate to acknowledge the 
method put forth by King, Keohane and Verba in their work, “Designing Social Inquiry”. 
This combined piece has become what is the benchmark tool for social scientists 
conducting methods research. Interestingly enough, these authors have been quite critical 
of the validity of the results that a process tracing method produces. More specifically 
towards the ways in which observing causal mechanisms requires causal inferences. Each 
causal mechanism requires its own definition and estimate as to how it relates to the 
effect. This can become quite difficult in cases where there are infinite measures of 
causal steps. The problem lies in having to identify the series of causal linkages, defining 
the causality of each variable in the sequence, and to identify the linkage between any 
two variables and any connections between their corresponding pair of variables. Thus as 
King, Keohane and Verba describe this system leads to an infinite regress, and fails to 
provide a definition for causality between any one cause and effect.93 
 However process tracers Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, do not fully 
agree with the concepts proposed by King, Keohane and Verba. In the work titled “Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences”, George and Bennett argue that 
these authors have established limits on other forms of method research by ruling that 
there is only one logic of inference, which in stating such produces methodological 
injunctions for single case studies and for the process tracing method. The methods 
outlined by King, Keohane and Verba are excellent systems for collecting data and 
testing hypothesis for a series of cases in which the study is quantitative in its nature.94 
George and Bennett emphasize that there is no linear logic of discovery, yet through 
theory development, historical explanation of specific cases, hypothesis formation, and 
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hypothesis testing; it is possible to produce procedures for generating new theories for 
deviant and outlier cases.95       
 In fact single case study methods hold inherent strengths over statistical methods 
in key areas. Selecting case study methods or qualitative methods allows the researcher to 
develop conceptual validity, meaning that there is a more appropriate means to identify 
and measure the specific indicators that a researcher intends to observe. Some variables 
such as government, power, and state strength are notoriously difficult for statisticians to 
measure, and require a detailed mapping of their own contextual meaning which is a 
frequent occurrence in case study research.96 Although statistical methods can prove to be 
an invaluable tool for testing and measuring the validity of a hypothesis, it will more 
often than not fail to generate an explanation or new hypothesis for the cases which 
remain deviant of the theory.97 What is important to note, is that qualitative methods 
allow for a more in depth exploration of causal mechanisms. Since a single case study 
requires a researcher to immerse themselves in a large pool of intervening variables, this 
allows the researcher to observe any unexpected aspects of the operation of particular 
causal mechanisms and identify what conditions are necessary to activate a causal 
mechanism. 98 Further expanding upon this, George and Bennett explain that a key 
advantage of the qualitative approach lies in its abilities to accommodate complex causal 
relations such as those of equifinality, complex interactions and path dependency. Case 
studies which embark upon unveiling such interactions and complex paths require a 
substantial amount of process tracing evidence in order to document the complexity of 
the interactions in order to legitimize their claims.99 
 Seemingly however there are a number of pitfalls with managing a process tracing 
method within a single case study. In reference to the advantage just made about the use 
of process tracing in a qualitative study, generating a method of inquiry in this manner 
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when there is equifinality present within the case study will make more general claims, 
meaning that the hypothesis presented will be more vague and prone to counter examples, 
as it is possible that more than one causal pathway could explain the outcome.100 
Selection bias is also a prominent occurrence within single case study methods, and such 
problems arise when the researcher specifically selects one case over others. Bias can 
also occur when the researcher unknowingly selects a case which is more tailored for the 
dependent variable than other possible cases. However in some circumstances, the 
researcher selects a case specifically for the particular outcome it holds in relation to the 
dependent variable. In such conditions, researchers argue that cases selected on the basis 
of the dependent variable, are appropriate when determining the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for yielding a specific outcome.101   
 King, Keohane and Verba also stress that the problems related to single case study 
research, is mostly based upon their reliance on one observation and their inability to 
generate theories that can make precise predictions in the real world.102 Very few 
explanations require a dependency upon one causal variable to explain the outcome and 
doing so allows for the emergence of alternative explanations to arise. The measurement 
conducted on the variable of interest is not precise, making it a likely subject for 
measurement error, in which case the true hypothesis may be rejected.103 Lastly, random 
errors are a frequent occurrence in single observation case studies, as they rely on a 
deterministic process. The real world process is not deterministic and as such the 
presence of omitted variables can lead to a different result.  Thus there is no basis on 
which to evaluate if the observation confirms or disconfirms a theory or is the result of an 
unexplained factor.104 
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 Nevertheless, I have decided to construct my research method based on one 
particular case study with the employment of a process tracing method to produce a 
causal chain of mechanisms, which will analyse the particular outcome on the dependent 
variable. The case of Syria is a very unique case and I consider it to be an outlier in many 
ways, due to the innate interests of different countries within the conflict settling. There is 
a subsequent failure of large powers or of the international community to intervene 
directly, a trait which is not shared by the cases of Iraq 2003, and Libya 2011. Thus the 
only means to observe and explain the dependent variable, which is America’s recent 
shift in strategic thinking, relies upon selecting a case study which corresponds to this 
dependent variable accordingly. Furthermore although there is a measure of selection bias 
based on this approach to developing a hypothesis, I would like to remind the reader that 
Syria is the most recent development in the context of international relations crises. Thus 
any theory derived from the ways in which the U.S. has responded to the conflict, would 
in fact be a valid conception as to how America’s methods of engagement in international 
crises has evolved.  
What George and Bennett claim is that for the researcher to negate the possibility 
of having varying observations along the causal path, a condition known as the degrees of 
freedom problem, they must present alternating theories which make different predictions 
of the causal path, this combined with evidence from process tracing and or congruence 
testing will provide the necessary means to reject many plausible alternative theories.105 
So long as the process tracing method yields a substantial amount of evidence which 
supports the observations made along the causal path, and no alternative theories are 
supported by the evidence, then a strong case can be made that with logical reasoning the 
causal mechanisms at play, allow for the hypothesis to hold validity. 
The utilization of process tracing within this study will be primarily based upon its 
abilities to assess the prediction made by the initial hypothesis and of the theory. George 
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and Bennett assert that this method is capable of testing if the observed process among 
the variables in the case, match with those predicted by the theory.106 However as the 
authors stress, many theories have not been developed to their fullest extent in order to 
make predictions of casual pathways. Under such circumstances process tracing can 
identify causal processes which have not been identified by the theory. Thus, process 
tracing does not necessarily test how well the theory predicts the case’s outcome, but 
rather aims to further develop the theory which explains the case.107  
The specific advantage in using a process tracing method is that it aids in 
affirming the validity of the case study. Single case studies which engage in theoretical 
testing can limit the amount of competing hypotheses, or at the very least exclude some 
of the alternative explanations if many hypotheses exist.108 Furthermore single case 
process tracing designs are not as prone to measurement error as other types of studies or 
designs, which encompass a variety of case examinations. This is because the 
measurements conducted in single case studies are on only a limited number of selected 
variables along several qualitative dimensions, rather than having to measure different 
variables across any magnitude of cases.109 
Given the advantages of process tracing put forth, I remain highly confident that 
the findings unveiled in my research process, will further add to the existing theory. With 
a process tracing analysis, it is possible to generate a high degree of understanding of 
how the causal variables of interest shape the causal path, which in turn structures the 
ways in which the U.S. can assert its power in the conflict. Such a research method will 
hold validity so long as there is evidence that deduces logical reasoning for supporting 
the proposed hypothesis.  
3.3 Identifying the Variables of Interest. 
                                                          
106 Ibid., 217. 
107 Ibid., 217. 
108 Ibid., 220. 
109 Ibid., 220. 
46 
 
 Now having provided the theoretical component of the model, it is imperative to 
provide specific variables of interest. These can better describe the relationship between 
the causal mechanisms, their respective path, and how the presence of these different 
factors all coming in unison form, what has become a precarious situation for American 
interests. Firstly, a more in depth look at each nation’s stake in the conflict along with 
their interests are needed to be considered, before outlying the causal chain of events in 
its entirety. This is necessary so that a greater appreciation can be given to the efforts of 
what America has been able to accomplish strategically thus far, and to further emphasize 
that all observable courses of U.S. action involve a high amount of risk. Preceding this 
assessment will be the process tracing analysis.  
To begin, the following variables are of significant importance because they all 
play a role in shaping the reasoning as to why the U.S. has not responded with a military 
intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the combination of these variables operating in 
sequence and being taken into consideration has, and as I argue, shifted the American 
strategic mindset towards a system, which maximizes the potential gains and minimizes 
the risk of managing security objective in a  very volatile geopolitical setting.  
The first variable that should be mentioned is the continued resistance by Assad to 
the international and domestic pressures. This should also be considered along with the 
response generated by his house towards the rebellion, and the ways in which it vests it 
power structure solely in a small diaspora of the population to maintain control. A second 
important factor is the current stature of America-Iranian relations and the negotiation 
process for the procurement of Iran’s nuclear program. Seeing as how Iran has such high 
stakes in the Syrian War, it is wise for America’s negotiation process to avoid risking 
further tension with Iran over interests in Syria. Another consideration is that of Russia 
wanting to reduce the course of action which America can take through the United 
Nations, thus making any direct intervention in Syria an unsanctioned action by the 
international community. Another important cause is the development of the armed 
opposition forces and their repeated failures to unify.  
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The final two causes that will be identified are the inability of the Syrian 
opposition to effectively unify, and the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Assessing the 
threat posed by these chemical weapons to America’s greater strategic interests, as well 
as accounting for the impact foreign fighters and Islamist groups have on the opposition, 
are all fundamental components which shape America’s motives in Syria.   
4. Investigating Key Actors and Their Interests. 
4.1 Identifying the Principal Actors in the Conflict.  
 Although a brief description of the different actors involved in this conflict was 
provided in the introduction chapter, I find it necessary to expand upon certain elements 
that many of these nations regard as being their interests at stake. This will provide a 
deeper understanding of how the actions of one actor influence the decisions made by 
another, along with the interconnectedness of certain developments. This process is what 
begins the sequencing of measures along the causal path.    
 This chapter will begin by underlying the interests of the larger powers at play and 
will proceed to analysing the necessity for involvement by the smaller regional players. 
This synopsis from the international to the regional level of competing interests, should 
provide a sufficient framework for understanding how these causal events, influenced 
their corresponding outcomes.  
4.2 America’s Involvement with Syria. 
 America’s immediate interests in the Syrian War are derived from the concerns 
over the potential spillover effects that could transpire from a destabilized Syria, and the 
consequences this would have on the region. Furthermore, as the situation in Syria 
continues to deteriorate, more and more Syrians feel the urgent need to flee the country, 
putting a strain on all of Syria’s neighbours. Currently over one million registered Syrian 
refugees have fled the country, half are sheltered within Turkey and Jordan, and their 
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growing numbers further solidify this predicament.110 Another difficulty for the U.S. is 
that many state and non-state actors remain willing to support Assad, despite all the 
atrocities. Iran remains the most vital supplier of arms into Syria. Iran has also provided 
members of its Revolutionary Guard to help train and even fight alongside Assad’s 
forces, and there are elements of Hezbollah within the Syrian Army. One of America’s 
regional partners, Iraq, has continued to allow Iran to fly weapons through its territory, 
with final destinations in Syria. Countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already 
directly arming the opposition, and the traditional allies of Britain and France are looking 
for means to further arm the opposition.111   
The rise in violence and the forceful methods that Al-Assad imposes upon his 
people to sustain control continues to alarm the American Congress. In response, the 
underlying objective of American action in this conflict has been to initiate a regime 
change. Some members of Congress have argued in favour of the U.S. pursuing a more 
hardline approach to dealing with Assad. Yet many caution the use of force and the 
negative impact an abrupt intervention or regime change could have on stability in the 
Middle East and Levant.112 Another major concern is that of the increasing presence of 
extremist groups, whom seek to exploit the power vacuum within Syria generated by the 
deteriorating situation. There have been reports of Islamists fleeing in mass from Iraq to 
Syria, and holding influence within the Syrian opposition. This further complicates 
matters for American interests in the conflict.113  
America’s greatest security interest in the conflict is the chemical weapons surplus 
that Assad has at his exposal, and the threat this poses against global security and 
stability. Israel has already acknowledged that if these weapons are to be transferred to 
elements of Hezbollah or to other terrorist groups, it would consider such actions as an 
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act of war. As stated earlier, the Obama Administration has already taken a similar stance 
on such a matter however, determining the location and ultimately securing these storage 
facilities in Syria is a very difficult and daunting task.114 
The American response in return, has come in the form of procuring a diplomatic 
solution, through supporting the efforts of the United Nations and by exerting further 
pressure on Assad. America has demonstrated a willingness to support initiatives, such as 
the Annan Plan, which aims to relieve the humanitarian disaster by imposing a ceasefire. 
Furthermore, the U.S. has taken action by enforcing sanctions on Assad, which have had 
a significant impact on the regime’s stability and finances. These sanctions have mostly 
taken effect on the oil and business sector, which has thus far cost the Syrian Regime 
approximately one third of its annual income.115 In order to help bring about a successful 
transition in Syria, the U.S. has actively engaged with the Syrian opposition. They have 
offered training and equipment to the opposition’s local leaders and activists, while at the 
same time encouraging dialogue in hopes to unify the Syrian rebels. The U.S. anticipates 
that these efforts will be instrumental in facilitating a regime change in Syria.116  
This is just one of a series of actions that America’s Ambassador to Syria, Robert 
Ford, has outlined over the course of the conflict. Ford indicates that America’s response 
to the Syrian War, has come in its effort to provide humanitarian assistance whenever 
applicable. Currently the U.S. stands as the largest donator of humanitarian aid to Syria, 
at an estimated 385 million dollars. It continues to be actively engaged with multilateral 
agreements that provide humanitarian assistance and relief for the Syrian refugees. 
However as Ford’s testimony acknowledges, the U.S. has not taken a further role for 
fulfilling the needs of the opposition, only providing non-lethal aid, humanitarian 
assistance and training. It is in the maintaining of this system that the current U.S. 
Administration feels is the best chance to maintain a pursuit of a diplomatic settlement. 
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Quite similarly, the message which Robert Ford reiterates to Congress is that a political 
transition through negotiation remains to be the ideal end to the conflict.117  
Despite the willingness of the Washington to maintain a moderate approach in the 
developing conflict, some policy analysts and advisors have stated the potential pitfalls of 
such a strategy, especially when the circumstances on the ground are taken into account. 
Jon B. Alterman in his testimony before Congress emphasized that a short and rather 
orderly political transition in Syria is a highly unlikely development. The longer the 
engagement is fought on the ground, the more emboldened the Assad Regime will be to 
maintain its survival. Assad’s partners will be in greater support of Assad’s clinging to 
power, and the opposition will become more fractured, as different sects would be 
concerned for their own survival.118 Alterman further explains how a lengthy engagement 
will only further benefit Assad’s strategy as recent historical events in Syria have 
demonstrated. Furthermore, the opposition parties have had their greatest success against 
Assad when they remained peaceful and questioned the legitimacy of his rule. Now that 
the opposition is armed, any conflict that is generated between Assad and the opposition 
forces, only helps to legitimize the actions taken by Assad to maintain control. This plays 
directly into the hands of Assad, as his forces hold a tactical advantage over the armed 
opposition.    
It should come as no surprise that the U.S. has taken a subordinate role in the 
conflict, allowing for the United Nations to pursue a negotiated end to the Assad Regime. 
The U.S. has seemingly avoided any opportunity to intervene directly and has tied its 
hands by linking its objectives to those that are matched with a U.N. consensus. In past 
events, the U.S. has demonstrated that it has no clear desire or need to act within the 
boundaries of a U.N. mandated mission. Yet for whatever the reason, the current 
Administration feels that it is necessary to act within certain limitations, perhaps as a 
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means to preserve the possibility for a diplomatic settlement.119 However, this brings into 
questioning how long the U.S. can afford to sit on the sidelines of a conflict in which it 
and its partners have so many compiled interests, and will diplomatic and economic 
sanctions be enough to force Assad from power? Dr. Murhaf Jouejati provided a 
stimulating insight into how the diplomatic pursuit through the U.N. will ultimately fail. 
He argues that the Annan Plan has no means to pressure Assad through meaningful 
consequence. No matter how powerful or daunting the amassed amount of sanctions 
against Assad are, he will always find a means to ensure his regime’s continued survival 
as he has demonstrated time and time again. Sanctions alone are not sufficient enough to 
force Assad’s cooperation; there must be a threat of force as well.120  
There is no doubting that America has the capacity to influence events in Syria. 
Yet it has continued to conduct itself in a manner which refrains from using its 
asymmetrical powers to force events on the ground. It instead relies upon the Syrian 
opposition to carry in this effort along with the United Nations. Perhaps the U.S. has 
acted in ways which avoid direct intervention in Syria, in favour of pressuring Iran to 
negotiate for a nuclear weapons agreement. In order to better grasp America’s 
involvement in Syria, it is necessary to further examine America’s relations with Iran, as 
both of these states are unequivocally linked in this conflict.   
4.3 America’s Dealings with Iran. 
For America, Iran has always been a challenge, as it has continuously directs its 
foreign policy with the objective of weakening U.S. regional power, while at the same 
time aims to establish itself as the regional hegemon. Iran has done this in a number of 
ways such as forging alliances with regional partners, expanding economic and security 
arrangements, sponsoring terrorism and rebellions, and pursing a nuclear weapons 
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program. 121America views Iran’s efforts as a direct threat to the region’s balancing 
features, and to the stability of the global energy market. 122 
Iran’s missiles and potential for developing a nuclear weapons program has 
become a significant concern for the U.S. and Israel. Firstly such a development will 
allow Iran to compromise the security structure already in existence in the Middle East. 
This capability will allow Iran to pressure Israel on its Arab relations, which will cause 
further hindrance to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Lastly, a nuclear armed Iran could 
deter U.S. action in the Middle East and possibly within Europe as well.123 Another 
concern America has, is that Iran is continuing to clamp down on the freedom of naval 
access into the Gulf, with a special emphasis on closing the Strait of Hormuz. Such action 
will hinder any U.S. naval forces operating within the Gulf along with any third party 
commercial vessels which rely on this passageway.124 Thus Iran’s current policies pose 
both significant security and economic challenges for the U.S. and its partners.   
The American response to Iran’s development of a nuclear program is oddly 
similar to the ways in which it has responded to Syria. These efforts of course have been 
to remain relatively passive and rely upon sanctions and diplomatic efforts to force an 
agreement. Currently as it stands, diplomatic talks and negotiations between Iran and the 
permanent members of the U.N.S.C., remains the most viable means for the U.S. to end 
the strategic competition between itself and Iran.125   
In order to force Iran to the negotiating table, the U.S. has imposed a variety of 
harsh sanctions which target the financial as well as the oil sectors of Iran’s economy. 
Key businesses that operate within Iran’s banking network, petrochemical and oil 
industries, as well as any company that was linked to Iran’s nuclear development 
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program, were also heavily targeted by these sanctions. Following the U.S. model, the 
E.U. took similar measures against Iran, unfortunately many of these new measures were 
not taken prior to 2010. Much of what is being seen now are only the recent strains that 
Iran’s economy has had to deal with, as the full weight of the U.S. sanctions has yet to be 
determined.126 What is crucial to take into account is the fact that these sanctions have 
forced Iran into a further isolated state, which has compelled it to take part in the 
negotiation rounds. Its foreign investment market was crippled, and Iran is struggling to 
effectively produce oil, develop new sites and export the product. Not surprisingly this 
has led to an increase in inflation and unemployment within Iran, thus providing Iran 
with an even greater incentive to approach the negotiating table.127  
4.4 The Strategic Importance of Syria for Iran; Where American and Iranian 
Interests Collide.  
 Iran has made its interests in Syria very clear, which is to preserve the state of 
Syria and to ensure the continued survival of Assad’s Regime. Iran has shown no 
restraint in its efforts to influence events in Syria. These efforts include providing direct 
aid and financial support for Assad, providing diplomatic support and guidance, 
supplementing the Syrian army with fractions of its own Republican Guard, and 
continuing to channel weapons into the country.128 However Iran’s influence in the region 
has been in decline, due in part to the spread of sectarian violence and having to utilize its 
resources to outfit Hezbollah. Yet Iran has to carefully balance its resources and cut its 
foreign aid to other proxies, so that it can immediately provide support to Assad. Iran 
ultimately stands to lose more if Syria and Assad falls.129  
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Perhaps the greatest interest Iran has in Syria is its geostrategic location in the 
Middle East. Syria provides a vital access point for Iran to influence Lebanon and 
pressure Israel. If Iran loses Syria, not only does it stand to lose a strategic alliance which 
has endured for decades, but it will effectively close off the corridor to the Levant which 
will further isolate Iran’s geostrategic position. Therefore Iran does not back Syria 
because it chooses to, but rather it backs Syria because it must and failing to achieve this 
will detach it from its most important partnerships.130 Preserving the continued rule of 
Assad remains the top priority of Iran’s strategic endeavour in Syria. However, the list of 
potential calamities that would transpire from an intervention force in Syria, has caused 
Iran to weigh its options if it cannot continue to support Assad. Therefore, Iran’s second 
option has already begun with constructing dialogue between the different fractions of the 
Syrian opposition; all in an effort to ensure that a Sunni Muslim dominated state will not 
emerge from the ashes of Syria.131    
What the developing crisis in Syria entails for both Iran and the U.S. is that they 
both face the fears of a long sectarian war enveloping the region. Although driving a 
wedge between Syria and Iran fits America’s foreign policy interests for many different 
ideological reasons, it does not do anything to diminish the risk of a potential spillover. 
Iran on the other hand would rather welcome a prolonged revolution in Syria than to see 
it fall into the hands of pro Sunni forces.132 
America’s response to the conflict and the way it manages its interests, reflect the 
idea that it has very little sway on matters inside Syria. Iran on the other hand is highly 
active and bold with its approaches, noting that it has significant leverage over how the 
Assad Regime continues to survive. Iran can press much harder with its aggregate powers 
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of influence than the U.S. can achieve by acting alone, and Iran is willing to accept the 
risks associated with managing sectarian violence, simply because it has no other option 
but to do so. Thus in order for the U.S. to empower itself further, it must cooperate with 
the forces that can garnish influence with the situation on the ground in Syria, so as to 
effectively counter Iran’s measures. 
4.5 Russia’s Role in the Syrian War 
 Russia is yet another state whose importance cannot be ignored when examining 
this conflict. Russia views itself as a major international player which offers up an 
alternative to managing global crises, and opposes the solutions offered by its western 
counterparts. With its veto power and permanent member status in the U.N.S.C., Russia 
presents an opportunity for the U.S. to bring a steadfast diplomatic solution to the 
conflict, so long as the interests of Moscow and Washington converge.133 However 
Russia has a strong motivation to counter American global influence. The U.N.S.C. 
provides Russia with such an opportunity, and the aims of Moscow are to ensure that the 
integrity of the United Nations is maintained by protecting state sovereignty and 
promoting international peace.134 Although Russia does recognize that there is a just 
cause for action in Syria based on the humanitarian disaster alone, it feels that this should 
not come at the cost of embellishing what the strict aims of an intervention are in the first 
place. Adopting a U.N. mandate to further one’s own objectives for regime change or to 
justify mission creeping are actions which are strictly taboo for Moscow’s principal 
views of state sovereignty.135 
 However what is to be considered, is that Moscow has its own interests in mind 
when making these claims and expecting such a conduct from the international 
community. Firstly, Russia views the Syrian War as an opportunity to stand against what 
has been done in Yugoslavia, Iraq and most recently Libya. It is about deciding who can 
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do what, what type of force can be used in the international system, what actors can 
become involved in an international conflict and under what circumstances.136 Russia 
mainly fears that without its efforts to resist, the U.S. can willingly pursue its interests 
without being constrained. By upholding the right to territorial sovereignty within the 
United Nations, Russia is essentially protecting its own interests in ensuring that the U.S. 
cannot intervene directly in areas near the Russian border, or even inside Russia.137 Libya 
served as an experiment to gauge how the international community would respond to a 
humanitarian crisis in an internal state conflict. By abstaining to vote for U.N. 
intervention in 2011, Russia allowed for the U.N. to pass a mandate which was to be a 
humanitarian operation in Benghazi. However, the actions taken by N.A.T.O. were in 
Russia’s eyes a violation of the mandate and the eventual result was the overthrowing of 
Gadhafi.138 Russia thus has been careful not to make the same mistake twice and has 
becomes hardened against any effort by the international community or the U.S. to 
directly interfere with events in Syria.  
 The second major interest Moscow holds in Syria is the historic relationship 
between both countries. After falling out of Damascus’ favour after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Moscow has been making a comeback in the region and regards Syria as a 
partner of particular importance. Trade between the two countries remains relatively 
modest, especially when compared to the economic ties that exist between Russia and 
Iran. Yet arms sales remain a particularly unique and important aspect of the Syrian-
Russian relationship, with current arms contracts valued at approximately 2.5 billion 
Euros.139 Furthermore there is also the matter of the Russian naval base in Tartus. 
Although Tartus serves more for a symbolic purpose rather than strategic to Moscow, 
nonetheless the base has accommodated and serviced Russian ships since 2011, despite it 
only having a quantity of 50 personnel. The symbolic value of the base for Russia is 
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unmatched, as it is the only facility from which Russia was able to showcase to its 
domestic populous and to the world that after a twenty year hiatus, it has once again set 
sail in international waters.140   
For the most part Russia’s efforts in Syria are well and good to re-establish 
Russia’s historical ties and presence to the region. However, this policy has more to do 
with Russia’s relations with Iran than for the strategic and symbolic relationship Syria 
serves for Moscow. Iran and Russia share a very unique and strategic relationship. Iran 
provides a likeminded ally for Moscow, in which it can utilize to resist American 
hegemonic influence in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia is a major oil exporter and 
relies upon Iranian oil to diversify its global energy market.141 Thus Russia is willing to 
risk colliding with America’s sanctions on Iran, because it is in its best interests to do so 
both from an economic and political standpoint. Iran can depend on Russia for support 
against American pressures, to provide a steady flow of armaments, provide 
technological capabilities and purchase its oil products. The most recent measures 
indicate that Russia’s exports to Iran are an annual measure of 3.3 billion USD and 
rising.142 Russia can afford to take this hard line approach against America’s interests in 
Iran because it is powerful enough to absorb any potential blowback and can isolate 
itself. However, Russia’s growing global trade network has found it making more 
profitable dealings with Europe, Israel and even the U.S. so for these reasons it remains 
concerned over Iran’s ambitions to acquire nuclear capabilities.143  
 Although Moscow has supported sanctions against Iran in 2011, as of late they 
have become very critical of the recent sanctions, claiming that it only serves America’s 
ambition to isolate Iran’s economy, strangle its population, an throw it into a state of 
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domestic turmoil.144 However Moscow has not let this undermine their relationship with 
Washington, in fact their strategy is to continue to pursue a favourable position with both 
sides. America knows it needs Russia’s favour to influence Iran, and Iran is extremely 
dependent upon Russian trade, for dodging the imposed sanctions so as to continue its 
economy. 145 It is for this reason why the situation in Syria benefits Russia the most, it 
can continue to play on this strategy where both camps depend on its support to further 
their individual desired outcomes. So long as Russia can successfully forestall any 
international action from occurring in Syria, it can profit from Iran’s economic 
dependence and any concessions America is willing to offer in exchange for Moscow’s 
participation. 
4.6 The Gulf States and Syria: Looking In From the Periphery. 
 There is no question that the breakdown of Syria threatens the regional stability of 
the Gulf. Yet the Gulf States remain divided on the issue of intervention, even though 
they all share a common security interest. The individual responses from the Gulf States 
towards the developing crisis vary deeply. Iran’s strategy which has already been 
described, is to support the Assad Regime no matter the cost. Lebanon remains fractured 
on a federal level, thus any decrease in their internal stability could derail their political 
structure. Jordan must also walk a very fine line in the Syrian War, as it too shares similar 
political qualities to that of Lebanon.146 With the acceptation of Iran, there is little support 
for the Assad Regime amongst the Gulf States. This has transpired for a number of 
reasons, most notably is the continued use of Lebanon as an arena to promote 
destabilization in the Gulf and to pressure Israel. Although Iran is very much responsible 
for this occurrence, Syria as an alliance partner to Iran is considered to be just as guilty 
by the other Gulf actors.147 Despite the shared hatred for Assad and Iran, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council cannot come to terms on sharing interests between the Gulf States, 
                                                          
144 Ibid., 69-70. 
145 Ibid., 69-70. 
146 Emile Hokayem, “Syria and its Neighbours” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, 
(April–May 2012): 7. 
147 Emile Hokayem, “The Gulf States and Syria.” United States Institute of Peace, (September 30, 2011): 1-2. 
59 
 
which has severely weakened the Council’s ability to influence developments in Syria.148 
Another development which has fractured the unity of the Gulf States is Assad’s 
resilience to maintain power, despite their combined efforts along with Turkey to 
denounce Assad’s rule and augmenting the amount international pressure that the regime 
faces. Furthermore the emergence of a proxy war enveloping Syria, has given rise to 
many difficulties and uncertainties in determining to what extent the Gulf States should 
increase their role and to what cost.149    
 Turkey has found itself in an interesting predicament in determining the correct 
course of action. In the beginning of the conflict, Turkey demonstrated some modest 
support for Assad, yet this quickly faded when it became apparent that Assad was not 
interested in reformations. Turkey finds itself situated on the front lines of the conflict, 
with its population in large support of the Muslim Brotherhood.150 Yet despite having the 
means to aid the Syrian opposition in a regime change, Turkey remains cautious and 
relatively passive, given its geographic proximity to both Iran and Russia. Turkey fears 
that competing against the interests of its neighbours will only further isolate itself from 
the region.151  
Another staunch supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood is the state of Qatar. 
Qatar’s support for the opposition forces came as a great surprise and upset for Assad, 
who once considered the small actor to be one of the Syria’s closest allies within the 
G.C.C. Assad’s response came in the form of an assault on Qatar’s embassy in 
Damascus, as well as threatening to seize all of Qatar’s assets in Syria. Qatar responded 
in kind by freezing its economic projects in Syria and forming a consensus against Assad 
both within the G.C.C. and the Arab League.152   
                                                          
148 Ibid., 1-2. 
149 Emile Hokayem, “Syria and its Neighbours” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, 
(April–May 2012): 10. 
150 Ibid., 10-11. 
151 Ibid., 10-11. 
152 Emile Hokayem, “The Gulf States and Syria.” United States Institute of Peace, (September 30, 2011): 3-4. 
60 
 
Saudi Arabia on the other hand has been a historical rival of Assad for many years, 
and the downfall of Syria, presents a unique opportunity for Saudi Arabia to capitalize on 
its interests in checking the regional power balance against Iran. By removing Syria from 
Iran, Saudi Arabia can match Iran’s influence in the Levant and make up for loss of 
losing Iraq’s power vacuum to Iran.153 Yet Saudi Arabia’s influence in Syria is quite 
limited, as it must manage its interests alone and can expect no help from its Gulf 
partners due to their combined distrust in Saudi Arabia’s agenda and its special 
relationship with the U.S.154 
The complexity that the Syrian challenge poses towards the Gulf States becomes 
embroiled with Saudi Arabia and Qatar arming elements of the opposition, which best 
serve their own ideological preferences. Qatar’s disposition towards the Muslim 
Brotherhood, has it supporting some of the extremist fronts of the Syrian opposition with 
weapons.155 Saudi Arabia has also been funneling weapons to the opposition and has only 
shown support for those groups which can further its ideological and strategic gains.156 
The question remains for the Gulf States not if Assad will fall, but whose party will be 
left holding the keys to Damascus following Syria’s collapse?157 The divisions that exist 
amongst the Gulf States are highlighted by this uncoordinated response to the common 
security interests at hand for the Gulf, which entail the removal of Assad and the 
containment of this sectarian violence. The process of having two key states participating 
in a proxy type of engagement against Iran’s efforts to maintain Assad’s power, only 
further fractures the opposition forces. Remaining fearful of each other’s intentions and 
checking each other’s power of influence in the conflict, denies the G.C.C. the ability to 
come to a consensus to force Assad out. The Gulf States have also failed to provide the 
opposition with a safe haven to conduct their operations in. Thus far only Qatar has 
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shown a modest interest in allowing for small meetings within its territory, while Turkey 
on the other hand has provided much of the staging area for the Syrian opposition to 
coordinate itself.158 Consequently due to their combined lack of effort, the Gulf States 
possess little influence on Syria’s outcome.  
Chapter 5. The Causal Pathway in the Syrian War. 
5.1 Identifying the Causal Pathway and its Influence On U.S. Action and Response.  
 Having identified the interests of all the major players in this conflict, it is now 
possible to investigate the variables of interests previously mentioned. These all share a 
role in gauging U.S. action, either by forcing it to reconsider engagement, initiating a 
response through other means to lessen the degree of blowback, or by enforcing a 
coercive strategy to procure a strategic interest. As mentioned earlier these variables 
follow a specified pathway where the outcome of one determines another and so on and 
so forth. This kind of sequencing of events does follow a linear and somewhat historical 
approach to understanding the conflict. What is most important to note is that the nature 
of one variable creates a condition for action, and this condition specifies an outcome 
which can either hinder or advance the interests of the United States, depending on the 
causal variable at hand.  
5.2 The Assad Regime. 
 To begin, the first variable of interest is the very nature of the Assad Regime and 
how its internal features make it resilient towards international and internal pressures. 
Since the time of Hafez Al-Assad, Syria has remained a brutal dictatorship, yet the 
regime has managed to develop ways to depict itself as being necessary in its cause. The 
Assad Family had never demonstrated the desire to be as ruthless as Saddam Hussein or 
to be as dangerous to international security as Iran or North Korea. Instead the regime’s 
                                                          
158 Emile Hokayem, “The Gulf States and Syria.” United States Institute of Peace, (September 30, 2011): 5. 
62 
 
message has always remained that its actions are necessary, based on the instability 
which plagues the region entirely.159   
Syria has tried to portray itself as the promoter of Arab solidarity. Hafez Al-Assad 
believed that ideology would restrict his regime’s flexibility, thus by valuing public 
opinion over ideological motives has allowed the regime to avoid previous pitfalls and 
crises.160 Ethnic diversity and freedom of religion have served as the cornerstone for 
Syria’s internal stability. By exhibiting itself as secular, the regime has been able to 
advance its interests amidst all the internal divisions of the modern Syrian Society. 
Approximately seventy percent of the population is Sunni Muslim, with the Christians, 
Druze, Kurds, and Alawi representing the minority.161  Syria’s foreign policy has recently 
been driven by its motivations to curb U.S. interests in the region as well as treat Israel as 
an aggressor state. This standpoint has been fundamental for the regime to legitimize 
itself amongst the Syrian public, whom incorporate themselves within a greater Arab 
identity.162     
 The Assad Regime’s structure of power is vested highly into the Alawi, whom are 
of the Shia Muslim sect. Following the decolonization of Syria from France in 1946, the 
Alawi became a strong base of political power in Syria during this time as the French 
bestowed power to the minority groups in Syria, favouring their rule over the continued 
dominance of the Sunni majority. The rise of the Ba’ath Party coupled with the 
increasing importance of the military within the Syrian governmental structure in 1950, 
allowed the Alawi to ascend to power. This is due to the fact that a majority of the 
military force in Syria was represented by minority groups, with the Alawi being the 
most prominent.163 When Hafez Al-Assad took power through a series of military coups 
in the 1960s, he promoted Alawi officers who were closest to him, thereby nesting his 
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rule on top of one particular sect of Syria’s minority. This provided the Alawi as well as 
the other minority groups, with a profound sense of power over the Sunni majority, and 
in exchange for their eternal support, the Assad Regime would ensure their protection.164  
 Now what has become an interesting development is the ways the Assad Regime 
has responded to the revolution set against it, and this carries certain predicaments for 
U.S. involvement. The Syrian Revolution was not a unified movement, many of the 
grievances felt by the revolutionaries predate the rule of the Assad Family, and other 
revolted based on the regime’s poor policy decisions. This is very much a reflection upon 
the variety of internal divisions that exist within the modern Syrian society.165   
 What this entailed for the regime, is that since no unified social movement was in 
existence during the time of revolution in Syria, Assad only needed to carefully adjust 
some of his social policies to accommodate the interests of the Alawi. In some cases, 
even securing the neutrality of the Christians and Druze was sufficient enough to ensure 
Assad’s continued ruling.166 Assad was able to do this with some moderate success, 
which allowed him to further depict those against him as being foreign radicals 
determined to undermine his rule and send Syria into an uncontrollable downward spiral. 
This media war provided further justification for Assad’s actions and portrayed him as 
being a saviour to his people. Behind the scenes, Assad met with many local leaders, 
businessmen, judges, and even prominent Sunni religious figures to ensure their loyalty, 
which furthered his longevity.167  When the fighting spread to uncontrollable levels in the 
summer of 2012, Assad had to adjust his rhetoric accordingly and announced that Syria 
was now in a state of war.168 This was immediately followed by a series of patronage 
appointments to the Alawi within the security sector. More minority groups were also 
given authority within the local community self defense networks. These developments 
plotted Christians, Shia Muslims, and Alawi together on one side, and they had now 
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become united in stopping the rising wave of Sunni violence.169 The minority groups, the 
Alawi especially, feared regime cleansing and retribution if the Sunni Muslims were 
successful in overthrowing Assad. For all the minority groups in Syria, their very survival 
and way of life became inescapably linked to the regime’s continued existence.170       
 The very nature of the Syrian divide allows Assad to maintain his power structure. 
There are certain complexities which emerge from the fact that the revolution cannot be 
based upon an Alawi-Sunni clash alone. The transfusion of interests across varying sects 
of class, political clans, regions, and religious identities further augments the difficulties 
in managing a social upheaval for either Assad or the opposition forces to gain 
momentum in the conflict.171 For the business classes, those living within Damascus, and 
the minority groups, all of which remain on the periphery, Assad remain the lesser of two 
evils. They will not shift their support either way because they remain fearful of the 
alternative, and these groups will not change their political disposition until it becomes 
apparent that Assad will fall.172 
 In fact when looking at the very nature of the situation on the ground, it becomes 
clear that Assad holds a slight advantage over the opposition forces. Despite the obvious 
facts that Assad has lost much autonomous control over the entire region of Syria, Assad 
still holds one enduring advantage over the opposition. This being with the remaining 
forces Assad commands, he is able to put forth a unified force both in ideology and in 
cause, that are committed to forestalling the fall of the regime. The entire mentality of the 
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Assad force and for the minority groups is this, if the Assad ship is to sink or float, it all 
depends on the unity of their combined efforts as one.173  
    The same cannot be said of the opposition forces whom remain plagued by the 
interests of large power states, which do not hold the same values or interests of the 
Syrian people. The opposition has no unified leadership, requires external actors to 
provide an area for them to coordinate and conduct their efforts, and their military force, 
under the so called Free Syrian Army, cannot effectively pressure Assad without 
resorting to similar acts of violence that the regime conducts.174  
The extents of the Syrian Regime’s military efforts were initially to crush the 
opposition forces and demonstrations with an overwhelming show of force. When it 
became apparent that the opposition’s numbers were growing and with an increase in 
defections within the Syrian Army, Assad began defending key areas of political and 
economic importance such as those of Damascus and Aleppo.175 By ignoring other areas 
allowing the opposition forces to hold ground, Assad has been able to counter with 
artillery, aerial bombardment, and Scud missiles. The application of this strategy has seen 
Assad’s Regime continue to test and cross the boundaries of international norms and red 
lines such as the use of tanks on civilians, artillery, cluster bombs, airpower, and 
eventually chemical weapons.176 
 Despite the overwhelming detrimental effects the war has had on Syria’s domestic 
situation, economy, and toll on human life, so long as there remains no international 
action against him, Assad believes that he can continue his cling to power. His military 
force still remains the most effective apparatus in the country, the defections which have 
grappled his military to its core, have left him with a more committed and unified 
fighting force. If he remains unchallenged in Damascus, Assad will remain the epicenter 
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of political power even in a highly fractured Syria.177 The real question then becomes in 
the face of such blatant atrocities, why has the international community continued to 
tolerate such actions without feeling the need for reprisal against Assad?  
5.3 The Russian Factor in Syria. 
 After having outlined many of Russia’s foreign policy objectives in the Syrian 
War, there can be no doubt that Russia’s fingerprints are all over the interworking of this 
conflict. During the onset of the domestic upheaval in Syria, Russia announced publically 
its staunch support for the Assad Regime. Moscow advised Assad to adopt some levels of 
domestic reforms, in order to ensure that it appeared he was making some effort to 
address the needs of his populace to avoid the same fate as Gadhafi.178 When the Western 
powers met with Russia and China in the U.N.S.C., Russia vetoed resolutions on three 
separate occasions. This derailed all measures of international intervention in Syria, 
including such measures as Resolution 1973 establishing a no fly zone.179 Russia even 
protested certain measures proposed by the U.S. and E.U. to impose trading sanctions and 
arms embargos on Syria. This is something which Moscow heavily criticized its Western 
counterparts over, for being not entirely honest about the West’s intentions, and for 
denying that the opposition shares any responsibility in the violence in Syria.180  
 Russia immediately followed this defiant act on the international stage by sending 
warships to the port of Tartus. This held the purpose of symbolizing the important 
strategic relationship Syria held with Russia, one that Moscow was indeed attempting to 
over-signify. The other reasoning for this act was to reinforce the arms contracting 
commitments that Russia intended to uphold to Assad. Moscow argued that continuing 
such arrangements with Assad were perfectly legal in international law, as Russia clearly 
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opposed any effort to enforce an arms embargo on Syria. Russia cannot be bound by the 
terms of the U.S. and E.U. embargos on Syria, because these arms commitments are in 
part a continuation of old agreements signed between Bashar Al-Assad and Moscow in 
2005.181  
 Russia defined its interests and expectations from the international community 
during a ministerial meeting in Geneva in June 2012. Moscow was successful in 
removing three key sections from the draft document proposed by the U.N. Special 
Envoy.  Russia overturned the following requests; a suggestion for Al-Assad to step 
down and not allowing his ministers to partake in a new Syrian government, a demand 
for the Syrian Army to remove its forces from the cities immediately, and the adaptation 
of the U.N.S.C resolution which included options for imposing sanctions on Syria.182 
Despite showing a lack of resilience on Syria, Russia has been supportive of the Arab 
League’s peace initiatives in 2011 and twice endorsed the Kofi Annan’s Peace Plan in 
March 2012. Yet the subsequent failures of both these initiatives, came at the expense of 
Russia not pressuring Assad to the full potential of the provisions within these 
measures.183 
 As mentioned earlier, Russia’s intentions behind such actions are primarily to 
prevent the emergence of another Libyan context, and denying the Assad Family a 
similar fate. Despite Russia’s agreement with the principle meanings behind 
responsibility to protect, Moscow feels that such actions cannot undermine the very 
foundations of international law. However under the surface there are other self-
motivated interests behind Moscow pursuing such actions. The Arab Spring could not 
have hit Moscow at a more inconvenient time than that of 2011, when it was faced with 
its own domestic embattlement between Medvedev’s pro liberal voices and those held by 
the Putin camp. What the Arab Spring signaled to the Kremlin and the victorious Putin 
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elite, is that an uprising in Russia was a very real possibility, and that a domino effect 
could very well unfold if Bashar Al-Assad was to fall.184  
It is clear that Russia’s defiance in the face of heated Western temperaments 
towards Assad’s continued rule, is a clear obstacle for enforcing any level of international 
intervention in Syria. So long as Moscow remains committed to this effort, the West must 
look for other avenues to exploit Assad’s weaknesses to force him from power. However, 
with Russia in firm control of the international context surrounding Syria, it would appear 
that any effort conducted at the international level to garnish a diplomatic solution is a 
foolish endeavour. America simply engaged on this level and vested a heavy interest in 
the Annan Plan because it was the only option that existed outside of direct military 
intervention at that time.      
5.4 Measuring the Effects of America’s Immediate Response to the Syrian War. 
 With the Syrian Regime receiving external support and with Russia protecting it at 
the international level, Assad had the opportunity to pursue his hardline policies of 
dividing the political opposition and ramping up his military efforts. There was very little 
that the U.S. Administration could do to directly alter the situation in Syria, apart from 
engaging in a direct military intervention which would not be sanctioned by the 
international community. Thus the U.S. responded to Assad’s atrocities by implementing 
a coercive approach, which existed outside the reach of Russia’s vetoing power. All in 
order to force Assad into a conceding position.  
 Following the Russian vetoes, the U.S. responded with a rash of sanctions over the 
course of 2011, which target key sectors such as energy and banking. These sanctions 
further complied upon a list of previous sanctions established against the Assad Regime 
in 2004. The 2004 sanctions prohibited the sales of U.S. goods to Syria and imposed an 
arms restriction embargo, and aimed at preventing Syria from further aiding in state 
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funded terrorism.185 In 2006 under the Patriot Act, the banks of Syria were considered to 
be money laundering institutions which financed global terrorist cells, thus all ties 
between Syrian banks and the American government were completely cut.186 The 
sanctions passed in 2011 hit at the individual level, where it was prohibited for any U.S. 
citizen to invest, export, or sell, either directly or indirectly in Syria’s petroleum sector. 
Furthermore, any Syrian assets, either publically or privately owned, within the U.S. were 
immediately frozen by the Treasury Department, if they had been used to bypass the 
prohibited U.S. business dealings within Syria.187 The E.U. followed suit and put a ban 
on travel to Syria, an asset freeze, and an arms embargo. This mainly targeted individuals 
and businesses involved in the financial sector and energy market. Yet it is worth noting 
that the E.U. even targeted dual usage goods as an attempt to impact the amount of 
chemical products being exported to Syria, so as to deny the regime’s ability to 
manufacture such weapons.188   
 To what extent these sanctions have had on Syria is difficult to measure, as the 
war for the last three years is also demolishing the Syrian economy. However looking at 
some of the measurable statistics and indicators of economic decay, it is clear that the 
sanctions have had a tremendous impact on the energy sector of the Syrian economy. 
With the analysis conducted by the Syrian Center for Policy Research, their figures 
indicate that 28.3% of Syria’s annual G.D.P. from 2011 and 2012, an estimated 6.8 
billion USD, was removed from Syria strictly due to these U.S. sanctions on the oil 
market. Syria’s oil trade has declined by 82%, with an overall decline in trade standing at 
52%, which translates to a sharp devaluation of the Syrian Pound.189 Furthermore, the 
Humanitarian Development Index of Syria has declined by 15%, this measurement taken 
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from the onset of the crisis until 2013, which translates to a loss of 5.38 years in life 
expectancy.190  
 The overall humanitarian impact this crisis and the imposed sanctions have held 
on the Syrian population is staggering. The devaluation of the Syrian currency, along 
with an inflated heating and gas price due to the economic sanctions on the oil market, 
has shown an average reduction in private consumption by 10.7%. The lower Syrian 
households have lost 14.8% of their annual consumption power, while the higher 
echelons of Syrian society have experienced a drop of 8.3% in their respective 
households.191 I remind the reader that these are the measured effects of the sanctions 
placed on the oil market alone. The greater humanitarian impact of these sanctions and 
conflict is the fact that an estimated 4 million Syrians are in need of immediate 
humanitarian assistance. The U.N. only has 184 million USD readily available for 
managing its activities in Syria. Furthermore, the U.N. has only managed to collect 337 
million USD, out of a required 488 million needed to support the Syrian refugees, as the 
U.N.’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicates.192  
 Thus one can observe that the sanctions are having a direct impact on the Syrian 
Regime. Not surprisingly however, it is the greater populace which is being hurt the most 
by these sanctions and not Assad himself. However these sanctions have certainly limited 
Assad’s methods for managing the conflict and fighting the opposition forces.  
5.5 The Scope of Iran’s Response and Greater Involvement in the War.   
 Given the grave interests at stake for Iran in the Syrian War, it comes as no 
surprise observing how rapidly Iran responded to Assad’s immediate needs. Iran first 
began its aid to Syria by sending advisors, steadily increasing its weapons supply to Syria 
and even sent elements of its own national guard.193 Iran has also been helping Assad 
finance his Russian arms deals, by providing Assad with an avenue to offload some of the 
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Russian arms contracts that Syria can no longer afford to fully commit to. Thus Russia 
does not have to terminate these previous arms contracts, so long as Iran is willing to 
accept some of the cost of the agreement on Syria’s behalf.194  
Furthermore, Iran’s relationship to Russia has been extremely effective in re-
establishing the dialogue and support lines from Moscow to Damascus. With the help of 
Iran’s dealings with Russia on Syria’s behalf, Moscow has cut Syria’s previous trading 
debt by 73% and has agreed to finance Syria with 300 million USD over a three year 
period starting in 2008.195 Although Russia has increased its ties and role within Syria, 
these efforts have yet to overshadow the role Iran continues hold in the evolving conflict. 
Iran has agreed to finance a large portion of a 730 million USD deal between Moscow 
and Assad, which will bring 50 Russian made short air defense systems to Syria.196  
In addition to providing Damascus with the means to access Russian arms supply 
routes, Iran has provided Assad with its own lucrative arms supply utilizing both land and 
air transport to Syria via Iraq. The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) has 
identified a number of Iranian airliners, YAS Air, as well as other cargo and airline 
flights with links to Iran and YAS Air, with carrying weapons that had final destinations 
in Syria. The transportation manifests of these flights detailed that the goods in transit 
were medical supplies and spare parts, however upon further inspection these crates were 
found loaded with Iranian small arms, artillery shells, rockets, and anti-aircraft guns.197 
Although there are no specific figures on such dealing or estimates on how many flights 
Iran utilizes to flush weapons into Syria. There is enough evidence on these illicit 
dealings to indicate that Iran is holding a steady hand in shaping events in Damascus.      
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What compiles on this evidence further is that Iran has also demonstrated an 
intention to not only arm Assad but also the pro Assad militia groups such as Jaysh al-
Sha`bi and Shia-Alawi opposition forces with munitions as well. The aim in this effort is 
to increase the resistance of these groups and provide them with a chance to continue 
fighting against the Sunni forces, if Assad was to suddenly fall from power.198 Hezbollah 
has also provided training and personnel to some of Assad’s forces and militia networks. 
Hezbollah forces are very robust well trained and well-armed, and hold the same strategic 
mindset to that of Iran. In order to preserve their arms supply routes from Iran to 
Lebanon, Hezbollah must continue its presence in Syria to ensure that Assad will not 
fall.199 Again much like determining the extent of involvement of Iran’s Republican 
Guard in Syria, determining the scope or status of Hezbollah operations in Syria is a 
difficult variable to measure. However the mere fact that both of these elements are 
present in the conflict, represents the greater extent to which Iran’s interest in Syria are 
real and are being threatened.  
In response to American sanctions and international pressure placed on Assad, 
Iran has demonstrated its abilities to help Assad navigate through an extremely unstable 
situation and is fully accepting the risks of maintaining dealings with the regime. 
Through its financial and military capabilities as well as its close ties to Moscow, Iran has 
essentially become a mediator for Assad’s continued survival. Iran’s increased dealings 
with Assad in response to America’s efforts to isolate Syria, have offset some of the 
pressures produced by the sanctions. Iran being coupled with Russia’s further 
engagement in Syria, significantly limits America’s abilities to manipulate the reality of 
the situation. Being unable to fully implement the severity of the financial and arms 
restrictions sanctions does come as a major blow to U.S. interests. It also further prolongs 
the course of war in Syria, yet it also presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. to exploit 
an Iranian weakness. This matter will be discussed further following the breakdown of 
the Syrian opposition. 
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5.6 The Fractured Opposition and Emergence of Foreign Fighters.   
 While Iran and Russia continue to supplement Assad’s efforts to remain in power, 
the development of events on the ground in Syria have enhanced this effort and have 
further restrained America’s options in Syria. Elizabeth O’Bagy, provides an accurate 
assessment of such setbacks in her report on the Free Syria Army stating that, “The 
opposition movement in Syria has been fragmented from its inception, a direct reflection 
of Syria’s social complexity and the decentralized grassroots origin of the uprising. This 
condition has plagued Syria’s armed opposition from the beginning. A lack of unity has 
made cooperation and coordination difficult on the battlefield and has limited the 
effectiveness of rebel operations. It has also reduced the rebels’ ability to garner 
international support and backing”.200  
 Such a statement demonstrates how a lack of coordination has plagued the 
opposition, and has severely limited the ability and willingness of the U.S. to provide it 
with critical support. This lack of organization stems from the decades of authoritarian 
rule which denied any right in formatting any social or political movement within 
Syria.201 Thus in the fall of 2011 when the Syrian National Council was created to 
encompass all the different groups and protestors against Assad, it lacked the political 
leadership necessary to unify all these different actors under one directorate. Furthermore 
the S.N.C. demonstrated that it could not exert any kind of authority over the rebel forces 
that had rapidly emerged and generated much of the rebellion’s momentum during the 
early stages of the conflict. The S.N.C. also failed at every moment to incorporate local 
leaders within its inner circle of operations. 202 
 What has ultimately transpired from all of this, was a tragic state of internal 
competition and divide between many different ideological fractions within Syria 
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opposition’s forces. When the Muslim Brotherhood allegedly took hold of much of the 
internal power structure of the S.N.C. though its overrepresentation, this problem of 
internal competition was further compounded.203 What provided the S.N.C. with a 
strategic advantage over the other competing groups and coalitions, is that it had been 
quick to openly endorse the uprising in Syria. This action allowed it to gain a premature 
endorsement from the international community, as being the official opposition of the 
Syrian people.204  
 The consequence of providing the S.N.C. with such entitlement was that it enabled 
the S.N.C. to have the financial means and responsibilities to enact in all kinds of 
measures and provisions for local governments inside Syria. However it still lacked the 
coordination and ability to properly administer such authority. The events which unfolded 
during the spring of 2012 further demonstrate this. On April 1, 2012, the Friends of Syria, 
made up of a large number of international actors and states most notably the U.S. and 
U.K., declared that the S.N.C. would be the principle channel for humanitarian assistance 
in Syria. The S.N.C. received 40 million USD from Qatar, Libya, and the U.A.E. but only 
managed to spend nearly 25 million on humanitarian aid.205 The U.S. and U.K. combined 
donated 200 million USD to the S.N.C. during the same time period and noticed similar 
results. This caused the Friends of Syria to call into question the abilities of the SNC. 
Eventually, individual governments simply bypassed the S.N.C. when aiding the 
opposition, either by providing local opposition leaders with funds through a middleman 
or through donations to the U.N.206  
 The lack of central leadership is the direct cause of the Syrian opposition’s 
inability to adequately finance their operations and to access arms channels. Unequal 
levels of funding among the different rebel groups have developed further disparity. 
Different governments, and organizations competing for influence in Syria will fund the 
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opposition forces in different ways, and will back only those groups which they see as 
ideological equals or as clear winners.207 The problem that such a system creates is that it 
encourages rivalry between the local rebel groups and unfastens the process of creating a 
unified opposition. More often than not, it is the extremist groups that receive the higher 
percentages of funding from the Gulf States, and there are many indications that terrorist 
organizations such as Jabhat Nusra have better equipment than the secular forces.208 The 
level of involvement and international support for such terrorist groups operating in Syria 
has served as a deterrent for the U.S. for supplying weapons to the rebels in fears that 
such weapons could be used against them, thus the U.S. has only directly supplied the 
opposition with non-lethal aid.209  
 Although the U.S. has not taken a direct role in providing the opposition forces 
with lethal aid, they have encouraged Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar to endorse certain 
groups and provide them with weapons. On a more covert level, the C.I.A. has had an 
active role in supporting the Syrian opposition’s secular forces by laying the framework 
for a large arms pipeline to be constructed from Croatia to the Gulf States. These actions 
came to fruition in December 2012, and were an American response to the increase in the 
well-funded and well-armed Islamist force in Syria.210 
 Almost from the onset of troubles in Syria, foreign fighters have amassed in Syria 
in hopes of overthrowing the regime. Many of these foreign fighters bring with them an 
expertise on how to wage an insurgency campaign, and have also proven to be a valuable 
asset for the local rebel forces in channeling more arms into Syria. Although figures on 
the amount of these fighters and their affiliations are difficult at best to measure, Iraqi 
officials have observe a sharp decrease in the amount of Al-Qaida linked insurgents 
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operating in Iraq.211 What is interesting to note is that Iran is an enemy of Al-Qaida, so 
their motivation for involvement in Syria to fight against Iran’s interests should come as 
no surprise. 
Thus far the only tangible proof of Al-Qaida’s operations in Syria has been the 
U.S. intelligence report on the car bombings in Damascus on February 16, 2012, which 
concluded that the bombings bore a striking resemblance to similar Al-Qaida attacks 
conducted in Iraq.212 Although it is difficult decipher between which groups sympathise 
with Al-Qaida which ones do not, what is almost a guarantee is that the longer the war 
rages, the more likely Al-Qaida will become involved. Such a circumstance will pose 
serious risks to Syria’s future stability, and will carry heavy implications for greater U.S. 
involvement in the conflict. 
5.7 U.S. Response to Iranian Efforts in Syria and to the Fracturing Opposition. 
 In gauging the United States’ response, I find it necessary to examine hearings 
from the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for gaining a better insight as to 
how Washington’s innermost circles view the current situation in Syria. It is the duty of 
these experts whom testify before the committee to thoroughly understand the situation, 
outline how and to what extent the U.S. is willing to respond, and to advise and influence 
key members of the American Administration on how to react to certain developments. 
Therefore, I regard their professional opinion on America’s policy options and response 
to crises as being a credible source of information as well as a good indicator for 
determining where America’s strategic interests remain.  
When comparing the U.S. Senate Committee Hearings on Syria from August 1, 
2012, and April 11, 2013, and interesting transition of dialogue emerges. In the summer 
of 2012, the mood on Washington was more relaxed, the U.S. was willing to engage with 
the opposition parties, but did not have to do so out of necessity as the opposition forces 
were showing they had all the momentum while Assad’s forces were in retreat. 
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America’s process in Syria was to build upon and enforce the sanctions as a method to 
oust Assad, while the opposition forces continued to pressure Assad internally.213 
Furthermore the attitude to Assad was also quite finalized, as it was a common 
impression among the committee members and testifiers that Assad’s days were 
numbered, and there was no conceivable way that he would be able to hold power for 
prolonged period of time.214   
Developments over the next eight months such as the greater involvement of Iran, 
the breakdown of leadership within the S.N.C., the secular nature of the war, and the 
increased involvement of foreign fighters all contributed to altering the strategic 
discourse on Syria within Washington. Beginning with the opening statement in the 
committee hearing on April 11, 2013, Senator Corker stated that “Right now we really 
have no good options”.215 Such a statement is the embodiment of a U.S. policy in Syria 
that was loosely structured and highly influenced by events which unfolded both in the 
U.N. and on the ground in Syria. By assuming Assad’s days were numbered, and 
observing the significant gains made by the opposition forces that summer, the policy 
makers in Washington deemed it unnecessary to directly involve the U.S. in the conflict. 
The Administration felt that it was best to remain on a diplomatic track to begin shaping 
what would be a post-Assad Syria.  
The involvement of foreign jihadist groups, the fracturing of the opposition’s 
forces, the development of a Syrian Civil War fueled by sectarian violence, and Assad’s 
ability to maintain control with the help of his allies, all caught Washington by surprise. 
It became apparent that America’s window for involvement in shaping the outcome of 
the conflict was rapidly closing. The mixing of all these different elements in Syria, left 
the U.S. with one policy option, which was to stay on the same course of action and hope 
that a diplomatic solution would emerge. Both Secretary Elizabeth Jones and Robert Ford 
                                                          
213 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Next Steps in Syria. Hearing before the 112th Congress, 
August 1, 2012. Testimony by Director of Foreign Policy Martin Indyk.  
214  Ibid., Testimony by Senior Fellow on Arab Politics Andrew Tabler,  
215 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward Syria. Hearing before the 113 th 
Congress, April 11, 2013. Opening statement of Senator Bob Corker. 
78 
 
have endorsed the message that continuing along the diplomatic path is the best method 
to procure a negotiated settlement, which is a necessary condition for a peaceful 
transition in Syria.216 Upon mentioning the necessity for a diplomatic solution, Ford 
carefully lays out America’s interests in the conflict which are the prevention of the 
utilization or movement of chemical weapons, ensuring that Syria does not become a 
base for terrorism, and for supporting the influx of refugees to Syria’s neighbours. The 
United States is supporting Syria’s transition by supporting local leaders and councils and 
provides them with basic services. Providing such an effort is necessary to ensure that 
anarchy does not emerge, so as to deny radical groups the opportunity to hold regional 
influence.217 Ford further explains how a negotiated political settlement remains a 
necessary condition, for ensuring that the minorities will not suffer repercussions from an 
opposition controlled government, and such a settlement is necessary to divide Assad 
from his support base.218  
 Upon investigating America’s response to Iran’s deepening involvement in the 
Syrian War, it becomes evident that America’s efforts against Syria are mirrored by its 
efforts to influence Iran. This is because as stated by Senator Mendez, “Iran still remains 
America’s number one strategic concern in the region and quite possibly the globe as 
they wish to acquire nuclear weapons, support Hezbollah and other proxies, and provide 
aid to Assad.”219 Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman affirms that “Iran has set is 
mark as being a global leader, yet its policies contradict such efforts, the end to their 
isolation is based on their efforts and Obama has made it clear that he will not tolerate a 
nuclear Iran”.220  
Both Sherman and Under Secretary of Treasury David Cohen highlight key 
elements of America’s response to Iran, following Iran’s deliberate attempts to keep 
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Assad afloat. Both Sherman and Cohen declare that the “dual track strategy”, which is to 
press Iran with sanctions as a means for establishing dialogue and negotiation, remains 
the best strategy for limiting Iran’s abilities.221 These sanctions have dropped Iran’s 
currency value by 60% and have cut Iranian oil production in half. By continuing this 
process, America is driving Iran deeper into a state of isolation where it has few trading 
partners to rely upon. Currently only 6 nations continue to trade with Iran for its oil and 
the further Iran turns towards degradation, the more likely it will lose its remaining 
trading partners.222 
In response to questions regarding the flight details of illicit cargo being flown 
into Syria from Iran, Sherman asserts that such effort make it clear how important Syria 
is to Iran not just as an ally but also to its security framework. “Many vectors influence 
Iran, our military presence, and our stance on Syria, and our efforts to ensure an 
opposition victory, are all having an impact on Iran’s economic and geopolitical 
capabilities.”223  Senator Tim Kaine builds upon this point further claiming that “The 
policy we have in Syria is directly reflective of our policy with Iran and because they are 
allies, loosing Assad would be a serious setback for Iran”. 224 Although it has yet to be 
determined how effective these sanctions and the dual track strategy have been in 
bringing Iran to the negotiating table, it is clear that the U.S. has incorporated Iran’s 
increasing involvement with Assad into its calculus on Syria.  
What Senator Sherman is hinting at, is that by maintaining the current course of 
pressuring Iran, the U.S. will in fact limit Iran’s ability to influence events in Syria and in 
the region. Although allowing Iran to continue funneling arms and money into Syria to 
bankroll Assad is a counterproductive strategy, it will increase the internal pressure that 
Iran is facing, as any finances it produce through its already crippled oil market will have 
to utilized to protect its interests in Syria. This will dramatically limit Iran’s ability to 
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finance and produce a nuclear weapons program. So long as the U.S. remains willing to 
support the opposition both financially and politically, it will be essentially able to drive 
Iran into further isolation and towards the negotiating table. Iran will overextend its 
abilities in this conflict and will bleed itself dry as it tries to keep its overloaded interests 
afloat. No doubt America’s strategy in Syria is largely shaped by its interests in Iran and 
wanting to force it into isolation. However, developments in the of the Middle East are 
unequivocally linked to one another, and as mentioned by Martin Indyk the dividing of 
Syria from Iran is a strategic gain for the U.S. but it becomes a strategic minus when the 
destabilization in Syria spreads. If Iran loses Syria they will want to hit back at the U.S., 
and they will do this by trying to spread the sectarian violence to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and ultimately to Bahrain, carrying with it significant geopolitical consequences.225  
The dual track strategy approach to Iran and forcing economic sanctions in Syria 
both rely on a diplomatic settlement to end the crises. However maintaining the status 
quo allows Iran to continue funneling weapons and finances to Assad, which prolongs the 
wait and decreases the chances for a negotiated transition to occur in Syria. Having 
passed on the opportunity to directly shape events on the ground in Syria, has limited the 
options of U.S. strategic thinking in the conflict. Thus the U.S. has had to yield some of 
its decision making abilities to other states, whom hold more a prominent role in the 
conflict and have more pressing interests in Syria. In exchange for this, the U.S. has 
gained a means to exert further pressure on Iran without having to compromise on the 
current strategy to deny Iran nuclear capabilities.  
5.8 Chemical Weapons Usage and Assad Crossing the Red Line. 
 Syria’s chemical weapons program has posed a significant challenge to America’s 
regional security interests and has required the West to exercise caution when managing 
the conflict. Although these weapons have been developed strictly to maintain a level of 
tactical parity with Israel’s nuclear capabilities, the presence of these weapons in 
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combination with the rapid deterioration of Syria, alters the very nature of this war. 
Official estimates are that Syria has in possession over a thousand tonnes of chemical 
weapons, a majority being a sarin nerve agent. This quantity of chemical weapons, 
according to Israeli Defense Chief General Ya’ir Nave, places Syria atop of the world’s 
largest stockpile of chemical weapons.226  
Much of the information concerning Syria’s chemical weapons program remains 
classified within military and intelligence channels. Yet it is well documented that these 
weapons are housed across the country, making it more difficult to uncover their exact 
locations. The Syrian Army also continuously transfers these weapons from one facility 
to another in order to lessen the abilities of the Western intelligence agencies to track 
their whereabouts.227 In July 2012 a Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman inadvertently 
acknowledged the existence and extent of these weapons in order to dispel fear that they 
would be used against civilian targets. It was stated that the development and deployment 
of these weapons are for a defensive purpose only and are stored by the Syria’s forces 
under the government’s direct supervision.228  
Despite the serious ramifications chemical weapons usage and development entail, 
Syria reserves the right to develop and use these weapons as it has not signed the 
Chemical Weapons Convention which prohibits the use of such weapons. However, Syria 
has signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of biological and chemical 
weapons.229 Regardless of having a legal means to permit further development and 
deployment of chemical weapons, the movement of these weapons indicates a 
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willingness to exercise this force.230 What is even more troubling is the concern voiced by 
the former head of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal Major-General Adnan Sillu, that 
these weapons would be used against the opposition’s forces in the event that Assad lost 
a key region such as Aleppo.231   
Prior to the large scale attack on August 21, 2013, both the Assad Regime and the 
opposition forces were allegedly accused of using chemical attacks on a small scale on 
three separate occasions in during the spring of 2013.232 Upon investigating the supposed 
actions, the White House announced on June 13 that a small scale of what was likely 
considered to be a nerve agent was used and resulted in the deaths over approximately 
100 people. However, Washington deemed the intelligence findings to be assessments 
and could not be considered tangible enough evidence to warrant action against Assad for 
crossing the red line.233  
On August 21, the Syrian Regime crossed the threshold mark of chemical 
weapons usage, as combined U.K., U.S. and French reports indicate that a large scale 
chemical attack had been carried out in Damascus which resulted in the deaths of an 
estimated 1500 people.234 The extent and sophistication to which the attack had been 
carried out, signaled a preplanned effort and surpassed the capabilities of the opposition 
forces, as missiles were used as the delivery system of the chemical agent. Thus the 
blame rested squarely upon Assad and his superior command for authorizing such an 
attack.235 The justification and motivation for initializing in this type of act fits perfectly 
with Assad’s own personal willingness to maintain power and demonstrate a show of 
force. As mentioned previously, Assad has demonstrated a need to continually push and 
test the boundaries of international norms and conventions on fighting civilian 
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populations. The offensive pressure that the opposition forces mounted on Aleppo and 
Damascus, made it necessary for Assad to demonstrate that to the Syrians and to the 
world, that he was willing to exercise such extreme force in order to maintain his ruling.  
5.9 U.S. Chemical Weapons Response and Subsequent Momentum Shift towards a 
Diplomatic Solution. 
 America’s initial response followed upon the President’s statement of a red line. 
Both the American Congress and the international community felt that Assad’s use of 
chemical weapons, provided justification for military action. On August 28, Obama 
stated that “The international norm against the use of chemical weapons needs to be kept 
in place, we do have to make sure that when countries break international norms on 
weapons like chemical weapons that could threaten us, that they are held accountable.”236 
Although he gave no specificities on the measures or to the extent such military 
operations would entail, Obama did stress that the United States should take action 
against Syrian targets, and both his French and British counterparts had given their full 
support in changing the international calculus on how to respond to Syria’s crisis.237  
 The request put forth by the 113 U.S. Congress for the authorization of the use of 
force in Syria, highlighted what the strategic purposes are in engaging in this kind of 
action against Assad. As stated by General Martin Dempsey, the necessity in the use of 
force rests in the fact that Assad has violated a norm which has been in existence since 
the end of the First World War. By responding directly to Assad, America is also sending 
a message to Iran and North Korea that such actions will not be tolerated, and that 
America is willing to act upon its international commitments.238 Secretary of State John 
Kerry highly emphasizes that the costs of inaction far outweigh any costs of action, as 
America must respond to its regional partners, and must respond to follow through on its 
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interests and the values it wishes to protect.239 Responding with force also has a strategic 
intention as the aims of America’s response will be to deter Assad’s Regime from using 
these weapons, and degrade Assad’s ability to carry out future attacks in this nature. 
Kerry asserts that when a method of attack is taken away from Assad, it has a profound 
effect on his military capabilities which ultimately serves into the purposes of a much 
larger grand strategy in removing Assad from power.240 
 Only seven days after the attack on August 21, U.S. warships began amassing 
alongside the Syrian coastline. Five destroyers armed with cruise missiles were ready and 
awaiting order to begin commencing, what would surely be a large scale military 
operation to destroy the chemical weapons facilities.241 Russia responded to this 
immediate show of force by sending two of its warships, while Assad began deploying 
his Russian made S-300 surface to air missile systems, as well as other weapons systems, 
in order to further complicate any invasion.242 America’s response mirrors the exact 
parameters of the coercive diplomacy strategy. The original demand placed on Assad was 
to not cross this red line be it by use of chemical weapons or transferring them to other 
actors. However, when Assad passed this boundary, deterrence strategy was no longer a 
viable option for the U.S., and the strategy had to be adjusted in order to prevent Assad 
from using these weapons in the future.  
The demonstration of force following the failure of the deterrence strategy opened 
a new window of opportunity for the U.S. to procure a diplomatic solution. Upon meeting 
in Geneva on September 14, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and U.S. Secretary 
of State John Kerry began discussing the structure of a preliminary agreement that would 
set aside the building tensions in favour of a diplomatic solution that would see Syria 
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hand over its chemical weapons to the international community. President Obama 
sanctioned this process by requesting approval for a strike in Syria through the U.S. 
Congress, thus delaying his intention to utilize military force. Russia’s aim to cooperate 
openly with the U.S. on this issue, comes as a surprise given that on previous occasions it 
has made its discontent with negotiating on a multilateral level for a diplomatic solution 
in Syria quite well known. However, the motivation behind such actions is to prevent 
America’s future use of armed intervention in Syria.243 For Washington, such an 
agreement is also beneficial, as it removes a key threat to international security and the 
procurement of these weapons is of grave interest to the U.S. Thus it makes logical sense 
that such a deal was endorsed quickly by both parties. 
The agreement was put forth to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, and on September 27, it was formalized by the O.P.C.W.’s executive council. 
This decision called for the immediate destruction of all of Syria’s chemical weapons and 
set a deadline for completion to November 15, 2013.244 To further instate compliance 
from Damascus, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, 
supporting the measures of the formalized agreement provided by the O.P.C.W. and 
demanded that Syria agree to all measures within the agreement. Furthermore, Resolution 
2118 requests that both the government and non-government actors comply with all the 
set conditions of the agreement. This specifically prohibits the transportation, 
distribution, acquisition or manufacturing of chemical weapons within Syria. In the event 
of non-compliance from any party, the U.N. will implore measures in Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter. 245 
As stated previously the U.S. has held two key interests in this conflict which are 
minimizing the risks of sectarian violence further destabilizing the region and the 
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procurement of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. Having passed on the opportunity to 
directly influence events on the ground in Syria in favour of a diplomatic solution, 
Washington found it necessary to respond to such a severe violation of international 
norms and in doing so helped produce a diplomatic solution to procure such a vital 
interest. Furthermore, the actions taken in response to August 21, demonstrate that the 
U.S. was taking a coercive approach against Assad. The breaching of deterrence set forth 
the means to demonstrate to Assad that the U.S. was willing to implement a use of force 
without international approval to defend its interests. This established a new demand 
requesting Assad to hand over these chemical weapons or to face serious consequences. 
The O.P.C.W. agreement and Resolution 2118, are the linchpins of this strategy, as they 
establish a set deadline and reinforce compliance by authorizing an international response 
if Damascus does not offer its complete support. All three criteria of a successful 
coercive diplomacy strategy are met by this agreement, as it contains a direct request, a 
mandated and set timeline for compliance, and a demonstration of a willingness to use 
force to enhance cooperation. By demonstrating resilience and persistence in pursuing a 
diplomatic effort to secure it regional objectives, the U.S. has successfully secured one of 
its primary focuses in the conflict without having to resort to a risky and costly 
intervention.  
Chapter 6. Findings and Closing Remarks. 
6.1 Findings from the Empirical Analysis 
Through this research paper, I have investigated several factors which influence 
U.S. posture and shape its actions in Syria, both in an internal and regional context. 
Combining evidence gathered on these different variables with the theory at hand, one 
can see that an interesting development takes place. The evolution of the Syrian War and 
the scope of its regional importance to several actors, has transformed this conflict into a 
war between different proxies. The presence of multiple players and the seemingly 
endless extent to which each individual actor is willing to become involved to protect 
their interests in the conflict, makes Syria a unique circumstance whose outcome is far 
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from being determined. One thing can be made certain, Iran with the help of Russia will 
not permit Assad to fall. As the theoretical model highlighted, when there is an influx of 
external actors in an internal conflict setting, many of these actors will divide the 
different domestic factions which best support their ideologies. With states such as Qatar, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia supporting their preferred elements of the opposition forces, the 
S.N.C. has been driven towards redundancy. The opposition remains highly fractured due 
to the influence that thee competing regional actors are forcing in Syria. Although such a 
condition does bode well for a system of power balancing, the direct interference of 
Russia and Iran operating in unison, has negated this delicate power balancing system in 
the Middle East. This carries profound consequences, as America is experiencing a limit 
in its abilities to influence key developments in Syria. At the same time it has been nearly 
impossible for the U.N. to facilitate a diplomatic solution. America has also limited the 
scope of its involvement in the conflict, by pursuing a negotiated diplomatic settlement.  
Although acting in such a manner does produce strategic benefits for a great 
power, it seems that the benefits of such a strategy do not outweigh the costs. From 
favouring a diplomatic pursuit over all other options, the U.S. failed to capitalize on key 
developments during the spring and summer of 2012. By not responding to these 
developments, and instead focusing on the necessity to remain impartial towards the 
opposition forces, Washington allowed other states to fill the gap. By the time 2013 had 
arrived, it was already too late for the U.S. to change its strategy. The only remaining 
option for the U.S. was to continue its course for finding a diplomatic solution.  
Now to its credit, the U.S. response in the form of sanctions both against Syria and 
Iran has paid dividends in garnishing an overbearing amount of pressure on both regimes. 
Yet in both cases, it has failed to deliver on regime change. However, it is worth noting 
that these sanctions have been establishing a means of dialogue with Iran and has even 
led to discussion on the negotiating table in regards to settling its nuclear program.  
 The loss in oil revenues in combination with the necessity for Iran to hold onto 
Syria, may provide the U.S. with enough leverage to sway Iran towards a settlement or 
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allow it to further bleed Iran dry in this conflict. This of course ties into the strategic 
thinking of how wedge strategies can shape international relations. So long as the 
sanctions on Syria continue to have such a detrimental effect on the Syria economy, it 
will be forever dependent on Iranian bankrolling and weapons. Thus by forcing sanctions 
on Iran, the U.S. can further drive a wedge between Iran and Syria, as Iran will have to 
come to the negotiating table in an effort to halt these sanctions. Even though the U.S. is 
blowing cold air on both Iran and Syria, it does not need to divide the two but simply 
force Iran into further isolation in order to limit its regional capabilities.   
Although the reliance on the opposition forces to pressure Assad while working in 
conjunction with the sanctions, does appear to be a viable means for the U.S. to further its 
interests, there were other factors which it lacked the capacity to restrain. Russian vetoes 
for every major attempt to facilitate international intervention within Syria did come as a 
serious setback for the interests of the United States. Though Moscow has been 
unwavering in its efforts to undermine U.S. action in Syria, it has demonstrated that its 
relationship towards Iran is strategic, but Russia’s relations with Syria are not of the same 
magnitude. Moscow favours Iran’s economic dependency upon it, but its relations with 
Syria serve more as a means to prevent greater U.S. influence in the region. So long as 
Russia continues to profit from the conflict and other actors depended upon it to access 
Iran and Syria, then Moscow will continue its course. 
What is also present in the analysis is that the events on August 21, initiated an 
American response which was highly successful in its end accomplishments. Although 
there is no substantial evidence indicating that Assad intentionally used these weapons, 
the sophistication of the technology in combination with the extent of the chemical 
attack, provided the U.S. with enough justification to warrant Assad’s Regime 
responsible. The willingness to use force as pronounced within the U.S. Congress, 
provided Washington with enough leverage to assert its unsurpassed power, without fear 
of generating hegemonic blowback for initiating in this type of act. This was a justifiable 
response to Assad crossing an international norm. Furthermore, as I have emphasized, the 
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single determinant which beckons immediate U.S. action in a conflict, is when America 
feels its security interests are being directly threatened. The use of these weapons posed a 
significant threat to the region and was a game changer for America’s strategy in the 
prohibition of nuclear armaments in Iran. A clear message had to be sent. 
Russia’s willingness to engage multilaterally on this issue and reaching both the 
America and the U.N. to establish Resolution 2118, came as quite a shock. Even though 
Russia did respond with a slight demonstration of its military’s regional capabilities, 
Moscow developed a very constructive attitude when it became apparent that the U.S. 
was serious in its efforts to initiate in a military response. Moscow’s cooperation with the 
international community, combined with the horrible developments in Syria, served as 
the backdrop for formulating Resolution 2118. Both of these conditions were necessary 
for formulating an agreement, and one can see how America’s posture towards Syria is 
very much dictated by external factors and the ways in which they work in conjunction 
with one another.  
It is interesting to note that with its first showing of assertive force in the region, 
America was given the opportunity to secure one of its major strategic interests in the 
conflict. This comes as a surprise given the theory which underlines that if a great power 
is to demonstrate its aggressive nature within a global conflict setting, it will be inviting 
severe counterhegemonic effects upon itself. The fact that America relied upon Russia’s 
cooperation should not discount the overall success that a coercive strategy was able to 
create. America capitalized on an interval development in Syria, in which it could 
properly utilize its strategy and forceful abilities to procure its interest.  
6.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Relating Evidence to the American Grand Strategy. 
When comparing the findings and factual evidence in relation to the hypotheses 
stated earlier, certain elements uphold each of the previous hypotheses. For the first 
hypothesis, it stated that America could make good on its security interests in the conflict 
by operating indirectly by relying upon diplomatic measures to produce beneficial result. 
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Although the sanctions have not yet forced Assad to step down, they have had a profound 
effect on Syria’s abilities to continue its daily operations. Similar methods have been 
instrumental for the U.S. in delaying Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and have provided Iran 
with good reasoning to approach the negotiation table. The sanctions on Syria could have 
a similar effect, with the final goal being to forge a negotiated settlement to end the 
conflict.  
Furthermore by weighing the risks associated with direct intervention, America 
has provided itself the opportunity to see the conflict evolve and can determine on its 
own accord when it is necessary to step in. Through keeping this offshore balancing 
approach, the U.S. has minimized the counterhegemonic effects that surely would ensue 
from being active in the conflict. It has demonstrated that when necessary it does not lack 
the effort to show its strength when its interests are being threatened, and from this 
process the diplomatic track has been a capable success. The only damaging evidence 
against this hypothesis is that the U.S. has not been successful in unifying the opposition, 
which is necessary to prevent the spread of sectarian war. This directs back to the null 
hypothesis and its viewpoint that the U.S. has not done enough to further its interests. 
Although there are several indications that the U.S. has acted in its own interests when it 
sees fit, the fact remains that the U.S. has been incapable of limiting Assad’s abilities to 
feed off the nature of the sectarian violence. This hinders the overall effectiveness of the 
opposition, allows Assad to maintain support from the minority groups, and prolongs the 
war as it threatens to spread to other regions, making a negotiated settlement that much 
more difficult to obtain.   
In regards to the third hypothesis or alternative, there is again evidence which 
supports that the America’s level involvement has been limited by the presence of many 
other external actors, all of whom have their own interests in shaping Syria’s future. 
Their preferred outcome to the conflict does not correspond to that of America’s, and 
their active involvement makes American efforts appear to be that much shallower. 
Arguably, the more actors that are involved in a competition, the less room there will be 
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for maneuvering around their shared interests. Thus, America has found fortitude in 
remaining on the sidelines, and allowing its regional partners to achieve their own 
objectives. However, such a strategy does have a setback. America cannot fully commit 
to its own interests when using this strategy as it is very much at the whims of the other 
actors whom are aggressively involved and its policy becomes more of a reactionary 
effort.  
Yet what the null and alternative hypotheses fail to predict or account for is the 
level of involvement America would take in response to August 21. The willingness to 
use force demonstrates that America’s interests in the conflict are strong enough to 
warrant a military action. Furthermore if America’s level of commitment was only 
determined by the scope of the other actors engaged in the conflict, it would not have had 
the means to generate such a high measure of response, which ultimately facilitated a 
deal protecting its interests. America’s show of force did not ignite a powder keg of 
counterhegemonic effects, but in fact resulted in Russia’s willingness to collaborate on an 
agreement which furthered the diplomatic cause. Thus in this regard the first hypothesis 
is supported by the empirical findings, while the null and alternative hypotheses fail to 
account for the events that led for the formulation of Resolution 2118. 
Having discussed how the empirical data tests the validity of the proposed 
hypotheses, it is possible to answer the research question and to finally assert how 
America’s policy in Syria is a reflection of its greater security strategy. To begin with, the 
coercive diplomatic track used following the attack on August 21, best exemplifies the 
means in which the U.S. can foster its security interests in a conflict, in which it has very 
little control over. What granted America the ability to engage in this conflict in such a 
manner and leave with an agreement, is reflected in the ways it has regulated its posture 
and involvement prior to the critical moment of response. By limiting its military 
involvement in the conflict and lessening the degree to which it would be associated to 
occurrences on the ground, it allowed the international system to balance itself, as 
regional players became more involved in the conflict for their own reasons.  
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When the timing became appropriate to demonstrate what America’s primary 
security interest was, it had the aggregate power necessary to demonstrate this showing of 
force. This raised the stakes for all others whom were already involved, and forced their 
compliance on an important issue or they would risk losing the status quo. This same 
result would not have been achieved if America became more involved during the onset 
of the Syrian War, as the threat of American force would already have been presented. 
This relates to the greater strategic focus at hand as adopting a policy of offshore 
balancing, in regards to the Middle East, allows America to remain on its direct course of 
pressuring Iran. Iran is possibly America’s greatest global security threat and Washington 
has devised a disposition on how to best handle this threat. By carefully using wedge 
strategies and balancing against Iran, the U.S. has been successful in imposing sanctions 
and certain restrictions on Iran and has driven it into further isolation, through driving a 
wedge between Iran and many of its trading partners. It is an imperative that America 
does not take action which hinders its abilities or forces a concession on its progress with 
Iran. This is why offshore balancing fits greater U.S. strategic objectives both regionally 
and globally. Such a strategy denies America from becoming caught in a compromising 
position and curbs the counterhegemonic effect.  
Relying upon diplomatic measures, allows the offshore balancing approach to 
function. If military objectives became the standard bearer of protecting global interests, 
America would be consumed by an endless cycle of strife and having to fight against the 
constant wave of counterhegemonic balancing. Thus, diplomatic measures and offshore 
balancing remain mutually exclusive with one another. Offshore balancing allows the 
diplomatic track to function, while the diplomatic track ensures that U.S. strategic goals 
will be met by following the process.  
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
The overall attempt of this study was to contribute to the existing knowledge of 
what is readily available for understanding the Syrian War. The findings discussed here 
cross many theoretical reasons that explain why several actors are brought into a conflict 
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setting. Although I have accumulated an abundance of sources which all provided 
evidence as to what America’s policy on Syria is, and how the unfolding of certain events 
determined America’s involvement. There remains a substantial amount of detail which 
is not in circulation as it is classified. The factual evidence on American policy towards 
Iran during over the course of this conflict will be highly intriguing to study once it 
becomes unclassified. Despite not having access to such information, my level of analysis 
and use of sources should not discount from the findings of this research. 
On a further note, in determining if this conflict marks a pivotal moment in U.S. 
strategic thinking, one can deduct from the findings of this study that America’s course of 
action in Syria has largely been determined by other factors which are unique to this 
conflict. It would be far-fetched to conclude that the U.S.’s efforts in Syria were 
methodically laid out. This would be an impossible reality, as American policy in Syria 
has largely been conducted by observing and responding to events on the ground as they 
unfold. What is significant about Syria is not what it indicates about how America will 
procure its security interests in the future, but the ways in which it must now go about 
securing its interest amongst the presence of several international actors. Syria has shown 
that the U.S. must collaborate with Russia and China in order to further their greater 
interests, and this conflict has also exposed the reality that multipolarity is once again a 
key facet of the international system. No longer will China and Russia stay silent about 
their own interests nor will they accept being sidelined, and this will carry serious 
implications on how the West manages it global strategic aims.  
Syria is an ongoing conflict and the final chapter if far from completion. It will be 
interesting to see if the combining of the opposition’s forces with elements of foreign 
fighters and extremist groups, along with a future agreement between Iran and U.S.A. on 
nuclear proliferation, will ultimately hasten Assad’s exit. 
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